Tainted-money recovery alone cannot sustain a corruption conviction absent proof of demand and knowing acceptance.

Sawairam Gurjar complained that Dharmendra Sankhla, described as a lineman, and a Sub-Engineer had demanded money to facilitate a permanent electricity connection.

In a Lokayukta trap, Gurjar handed Sankhla ₹11,000 in phenolphthalein-treated notes; the notes were recovered from Sankhla and his hands tested positive for phenolphthalein.

Sankhla was tried under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, and acquitted by the Special Judge on 12 October 2019.

The State sought leave to appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC, and Gurjar filed a statutory appeal under Section 372 CrPC.

Whether Sankhla, an outsourced worker employed by a private contractor, was a “public servant” under Section 2(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

Whether the evidence established that Sankhla demanded or knowingly accepted illegal gratification, such that the acquittal warranted appellate interference.

Whether the State had shown a prima facie or arguable case for leave to appeal, and whether the complainant’s appeal should succeed.

Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 require proof of the elements of the charged offence; under Neeraj Dutta v. State (NCT of Delhi), proof of demand and acceptance or obtainment of illegal gratification is foundational, and may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence.

Mere recovery of tainted currency, without reliable proof of demand or culpable acceptance, is insufficient; the Section 20 presumption applies only once its foundational facts are established.

Section 2(c)(viii) defines relevant categories of public servants, while Section 19 requires previous sanction for cognizance of specified offences against a public servant.

Under Sections 378(3) and 372 CrPC, an acquittal appeal is subject to the reinforced presumption of innocence; although the appellate court may reappreciate the evidence, it should not disturb a reasonably possible view.

The evidence showed that Sankhla was employed and paid by a private service provider as an unskilled contractual labourer, and held no authority to sanction or facilitate an electricity connection; the Court therefore found that he was not a public servant under Section 2(c)(viii).

The Court further concluded that the recordings, read in context, concerned the application process and official connection charges: they referred to money being “deposited,” while the complainant admitted in cross-examination that Sankhla had not asked for money for himself.

Although the tainted notes were recovered from Sankhla, the evidence did not reliably establish a demand for illegal gratification or knowing acceptance of a bribe; the material also supported a reasonable possibility that the money related to the connection charges.

The Court observed that no prosecution sanction was on record if Sankhla were treated as a public servant, but its primary finding was that he did not fall within that definition.

The trial court’s view was reasonably available on the evidence and disclosed no manifest error warranting interference.

It dismissed Gurjar’s statutory appeal, affirmed the acquittal, and declined the State’s application for leave to appeal under Section 378(3) CrPC.