Taking cognizance against retired public servants under amended Section 19(1) of the PC Act requires sanction.

The petitioners challenged the order dated 18 December 2025 in Special C.C. No. 338/2020, by which the trial court restored the case and directed summons to accused Nos. 1 to 7.

The prosecution alleged offences under Sections 120-B, 409, 465, 468 and 477-A of the IPC and Sections 13(1)(c), 13(1)(d) read with 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

In earlier revision proceedings, a Co-ordinate Bench had remitted cases to the trial court and directed that, in the absence of sanction for the relevant accused, proceedings could not continue against them.

The petitioners relied on that direction in challenging the summons. The charge sheet was filed on 10 March 2020 and cognizance was taken on 5 August 2020; the State’s counsel fairly submitted that no fresh sanction had been obtained before the impugned order.

1. Whether the trial court could restore the proceedings and issue summons to accused Nos. 1 and 6 without obtaining the requisite sanction under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Whether the summons to accused Nos. 1 and 6 was contrary to the earlier remand directions of the Co-ordinate Bench.

Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, as amended with effect from 26 July 2018, requires sanction from the competent authority before cognizance is taken against a public servant, including a retired public servant, in cases to which the amended provision applies.

The Court relied on the earlier Co-ordinate Bench’s direction that, where the requisite sanction had not been given, proceedings could not continue against the relevant accused.

It also referred to Co-ordinate Bench decisions addressing the application of the amended Section 19(1) and the requirement of sanction.

Cognizance in this case was taken on 5 August 2020, after the amendment to Section 19(1) came into effect. The Court therefore held that the amended provision applied and that proper sanction was required before proceedings could continue against the relevant accused.

The earlier remand order expressly precluded proceedings against accused persons for whom sanction had not been obtained. As the State confirmed that no fresh sanction had been obtained, the trial court’s restoration of the case and issuance of summons to accused Nos. 1 and 6 contravened both the statutory requirement and the remand direction.