Tamil Nadu High Court urges service-rule changes to curb delays in corruption cases, gives authorities six months to conclude disciplinary proceedings

The four petitioners were government servants suspended following arrests in Vigilance Department trap cases registered under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

They challenged their suspension orders or the rejection of their requests for revocation, relying principally on the prolonged suspension and the absence or delay of disciplinary proceedings.

In Sunitha Ahilin Mabel’s case, disciplinary proceedings commenced approximately ten years after her suspension and resulted in her removal from service on 20.08.2026.

In the other cases, disciplinary proceedings had not been initiated, and the State’s position was that suspension should continue until the criminal cases concluded.

Whether the pendency of criminal proceedings, including corruption cases arising from trap operations, justifies deferring departmental disciplinary proceedings.

Whether disciplinary authorities may leave government servants under prolonged suspension without initiating disciplinary proceedings, merely because the criminal cases remain pending.

What directions were warranted in the individual petitions, given the status of the disciplinary proceedings.

Rule 17(2)(e) of the Tamil Nadu Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules was the stated basis for suspension following arrest and remand.

The Court relied on G.O.(Ms.) No. 66, Human Resources Management (N) Department, dated 06.07.2022, which provides for simultaneous criminal and departmental proceedings, while permitting departmental proceedings to be held in abeyance in appropriate cases involving complicated questions of fact or law or a risk of prejudice; the decision must turn on the circumstances of the particular case.

It also referred to G.O.(Ms.) No. 81 dated 04.08.2022 and G.O.(Ms.) No. 34 dated 17.06.2026 concerning timelines for disciplinary proceedings.

Applying State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena, A.P. SRTC v. Mohd. Yousuf Miya, Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. T. Srinivas, and Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Sarvesh Berry, the Court reaffirmed that there is no general legal bar to simultaneous proceedings; departmental and criminal proceedings serve different purposes and apply different standards of proof. A stay may be appropriate in particular circumstances, but criminal-case pendency alone is insufficient.

The Court held that the State’s reliance on the criminal cases did not justify the prolonged failure to pursue disciplinary action.

The Government’s own instructions permitted simultaneous proceedings, and the Court’s cited authorities confirmed that any decision to defer an inquiry must be based on case-specific considerations—not merely on the fact that a criminal case is pending.

It considered the delay particularly serious where officials facing corruption allegations remained suspended and received subsistence allowance without disciplinary proceedings being initiated.

The Court therefore required prompt departmental action, while leaving the criminal proceedings to continue independently.

The other writ petitions were disposed of with directions to the respective disciplinary authorities to initiate proceedings and conclude them within six months of receiving the order.

The petitioners remained entitled to eligible subsistence allowance during suspension pending those proceedings.

The Court stated that failure to meet the deadline could give rise to a presumption that the authorities were aiding the delinquent officers in avoiding punishment and could warrant disciplinary action against those authorities.