Technical property details from records may be utilized for stamp duty assessment to facilitate decree completion.

The matter pertains to a consent decree passed by a Division Bench on May 22, 1997, based on the "Mittal Settlement" for the partition and allotment of properties.

Although the settlement identified properties, it lacked technical descriptions (title deed details), leading the Collector to report an inability to assess stamp duty for registration.

Defendant No. 1’s previous application to amend the decree under Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) was rejected by the High Court in 1999 and the Supreme Court in 2009.

However, a subsequent coordinate bench order dated April 3, 2019, held that a party cannot be left remediless and authorized the Department to include "short recitals" from the pleadings to complete the decree.

Defendant No. 1 filed a supplementary affidavit on February 10, 2026, providing the necessary technical property details to facilitate valuation by the Collector.

Respondents opposed this, citing the doctrine of merger and alleging an impermissible attempt to modify the decree after the Supreme Court’s finality.

1. Whether the provision of technical property details via supplementary affidavit constitutes an impermissible modification or alteration of the 1997 decree in violation of Section 152 CPC and the doctrine of merger.

2. Whether the Collector can be directed to assess stamp duty based on technical details found in the pleadings and supplementary affidavit to facilitate the drawing up and registration of the decree.

The court applied Section 152 of the CPC regarding the correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments or decrees.

It relied on Chapter XVI Rule 11 of the Original Side Rules of the Calcutta High Court, which empowers the Registrar to include short recitals in a decree.

The court further considered the "Doctrine of Merger" as defined in Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala, which posits that a lower court's order merges into the superior court's order upon adjudication.

Additionally, it applied the principle that a decree-holder must not be left remediless to enjoy the "fruits of the decree" due to technical departmental omissions.

The Court distinguished between an application to alter a decree under Section 152 CPC (which was previously rejected) and an application to complete/register a decree.

It reasoned that providing technical details existing in the records does not equate to an "improvement" or modification of the decree’s substance, but rather serves the administrative necessity of stamp duty assessment.

The Court noted that the 2019 judgment—which remained unchallenged—specifically authorized the Department to collect particulars from the pleadings to draw up the decree.

Consequently, the technical details provided in the supplementary affidavit were deemed consistent with the existing material on record.

The Court rejected the Respondents' reliance on the doctrine of merger and res judicata, holding that the current prayer for drawing up and registration is distinct from the prior failed attempts to invoke Section 152 CPC.

The Collector was directed to assess the stamp duty based on these details and submit a report to the High Court within four weeks.

The Court held that facilitating the assessment of stamp duty is a necessary step to ensure the parties can enjoy the fruits of a decades-old consent decree.

Prayers for a stay of this order by the Appellants and Respondents were rejected.