01Facts
Respondent No. 1 filed a suit for permanent injunction to protect his possession of the first-floor portion of a building in Amritsar, described as tenanted premises.
pp. 1–4 · ¶ 2–3, 6–7The petitioner filed a counterclaim asserting that he had purchased the entire property, including the premises, at a bank auction.
pp. 1–4 · ¶ 2–3, 6–7He later applied under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to reject the plaint, arguing that the suit was barred by Sections 14, 17 and 34 of the SARFAESI Act, 2002.
pp. 1–4 · ¶ 2–3, 6–7The Trial Court dismissed the application, noting, among other things, that no supporting material concerning SARFAESI proceedings had been produced and that the suit did not challenge any action under that Act.
pp. 1–4 · ¶ 2–3, 6–7In the revision petition, the petitioner did not place a copy of the plaint on the record or show it to the High Court.
p. 4 · ¶ 802Issues
i.1. Whether the plaint was liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit was barred by Sections 34 and 35 of the SARFAESI Act.
pp. 5–6 · ¶ 10–11ii.2. Whether the petitioner had established a basis for the High Court to interfere with the Trial Court’s dismissal of the application.
p. 4, 7 · ¶ 8, 1203Law Applied
Under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must assess the plaint’s averments; the defendant’s pleadings are immaterial, and the power to reject a plaint must be exercised in accordance with the rule’s specified conditions (Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India, 2020 SCC OnLine SC 482).
p. 5 · ¶ 9.1Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act bars civil-court jurisdiction over matters that the DRT or DRAT is empowered to determine and restricts injunctions concerning such matters; Section 35 gives the Act overriding effect over inconsistent laws.
pp. 5–6 · ¶ 10–10.1A civil-court jurisdiction bar is not readily inferred and must be strictly construed (Dwarka Prasad Agarwal v. Ramesh Chander Agarwal, (2003) 6 SCC 220).
p. 6 · ¶ 10.3The Court also referred to Central Bank of India v. Prabha Jain, (2025) 4 SCC 38, concerning the DRT’s statutory powers, and Ajay Solanki v. Parvesh Kumar, SLP (C) No. 13655 of 2024, decided 11 July 2024, for the proposition that an objection to maintainability does not strictly fall within Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
pp. 6–7 · ¶ 10.2, 11.1Provisions in the judgment · 4 · Linked ones open on LawLens
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 Section 14Section 17Section 34Section 35
04Reasoning
The High Court could not independently examine the plaint because the petitioner had neither filed nor shown it, and therefore relied on the Trial Court’s account of the suit.
p. 4 · ¶ 8That account showed a claim for protection of possession and no challenge to any action taken under the SARFAESI Act.
p. 4 · ¶ 8The petitioner also produced no material establishing that proceedings under the Act were being carried out.
pp. 3–4 · ¶ 7 · p. 6 · ¶ 11In those circumstances, the petitioner had not shown that the suit concerned a matter within the DRT’s statutory jurisdiction or that the plaint disclosed a bar warranting rejection under Order VII Rule 11.
p. 6 · ¶ 11The Court further noted that a maintainability objection did not, by itself, strictly fall within that provision.
p. 7 · ¶ 11.105Holding
The High Court found no cogent reason to interfere with the Trial Court’s order dismissing the Order VII Rule 11 CPC application.
p. 7 · ¶ 12The civil revision petition was dismissed, and any pending applications were closed.
p. 7 · ¶ 12–14Original Court PDF
Pawan Kumar SethvsTejinder Singh And Ors
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