P&H HC Upholds Order Returning Upper Floors To 90-Year-Old Father From Son With No Independent Property Right

Respondent No. 3, the petitioner’s father, sought protection of his life and property and possession of the first and second floors of a Chandigarh house.

The property had been transferred to respondent No. 4 in 2015 and re-transferred to respondent No. 3 by registered deed in 2021; the petitioner alleged that the re-transfer was engineered to facilitate his eviction.

The Maintenance Tribunal verified respondent No. 3’s ownership, directed that he be permitted to occupy the upper floors, and allowed the petitioner to remain in part of the ground floor temporarily while his mother required medical care. It declined monetary maintenance, having regard to respondent No. 3’s pension and other properties.

The Appellate Authority dismissed the petitioner’s appeal and directed that the upper floors be handed over to respondent No. 3.

The petitioner challenged both orders by writ petition. His mother died during the proceedings, ending the stated basis for the temporary ground-floor arrangement.

The Court applied Sections 21 and 22(2) of the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, read with Rule 20 of the Chandigarh Maintenance of Parents and Senior Citizens Rules, 2009, as amended, which provide a mechanism for protecting senior citizens’ life and property, including eviction from unauthorised occupation where the prescribed process is followed.

It held that the Tribunal’s eviction power is ancillary to its statutory jurisdiction and may be exercised where eviction is necessary and expedient to protect a senior citizen, but not mechanically; competing claims and proportionality must be considered.

This principle was drawn from S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730, Samtola Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 669, and the other Supreme Court decisions discussed in the judgment.

Section 24 concerns abandonment and its penal consequences, while Section 23 concerns avoidance of certain transfers; neither is, by itself, the exclusive source of eviction power.

A testamentary instrument does not itself effect an inter vivos transfer of title.

The Court found that respondent No. 3’s ownership had been verified, the petitioner had notice and an opportunity to object, and no independent proprietary or tenancy right in the petitioner had been established.

The alleged collusion and earlier family proceedings did not displace the registered re-transfer deed; any substantive challenge to that deed belonged before a competent civil forum.

Respondent No. 3’s income and other assets justified declining monetary maintenance but did not preclude protection of his property.

The directions were limited: they restored only the upper floors to the verified owner, preserved the mother’s protected ground-floor possession, and allowed the petitioner temporary occupation there for her care. Her death ended the basis for that temporary arrangement, without affecting respondent No. 3’s entitlement to the upper floors.

The Court therefore found the relief proportionate and no ground for writ interference.

It dismissed the writ petition and upheld the orders dated 8 December 2023 and 27 November 2025, subject to clarification that any dispute over implementation of the conditional ground-floor arrangement could be taken to the competent authority. The interim order was vacated, and pending miscellaneous applications were disposed of.