P&H HC Rejects Dhaba Couple’s Police-Protection Plea, Finds No Material Of Immediate Threat Amid Land Dispute

The petitioners sought police protection for themselves and their minor child, alleging repeated threats, assaults and interference with their possession of a dhaba and adjoining premises.

They relied on complaints to the police, revenue records and civil-court orders, including an injunction dated 1 November 2019 and a decree dated 28 July 2023.

The State filed an affidavit stating that inquiries had found no substantiated threat, that the dispute concerned ownership and possession, and that regular patrolling and other precautionary measures were in place; the threat assessment was negative.

The petition was brought under Article 226 of the Constitution and also sought directions to register an FIR and award compensation.

The Court considered Article 226 of the Constitution, read with the petitioners’ claims under Articles 21 and 14.

It held that a direction for police protection must rest on an assessment of the material circumstances and cannot be issued merely to resolve a continuing dispute over immovable property.

The Court also applied the general principle that extraordinary writ intervention requires material establishing an immediate danger or exceptional circumstances warranting such intervention.

No statutory provision or judicial precedent was cited in the judgment as the basis for these principles.

The Court weighed the petitioners’ allegations and supporting material against the State’s fresh threat assessment, which found no genuine threat and reported that regular police patrolling and precautionary measures were in place.

It found that the petitioners had presented only general allegations and had not demonstrated an immediate danger or exceptional circumstances.

Because the dispute substantially concerned ownership, possession and use of immovable property, the Court concluded that police protection could not be used to resolve it through writ proceedings.

It clarified that its observations were confined to the writ petition and did not express an opinion on the merits of pending or future proceedings between the parties; any pending applications were also disposed of.