Tender experience must be genuinely similar in nature, not merely equivalent in quantity.

The petitioner submitted a bid for restoration and lining of the left side of Main Canal No. 01, Khatima, Udham Singh Nagar District, for the reach between Km 2.200 and Km 4.500.

The petitioner’s bid was declared technically non-responsive on the grounds that he lacked the prescribed experience and had not submitted the audit report for 2021.

The contract was subsequently awarded to respondent no. 4.

The audit-report defect was later cured when the petitioner supplied the report, and the Court treated that defect as minor.

The dispute therefore concerned whether the petitioner’s previous experience—relating to construction of a canal for channelising flood water and other channel/sewage-related works—qualified as experience in a “similar work” under the tender conditions.

The tender required satisfactory completion of at least one similar work involving canal lining in brickwork, with similarity assessed by reference to the nature, physical size, complexity, methods, technology and other characteristics of the required work.

It also prescribed minimum quantities of cement concrete, including RCC/PCC, and brickwork.

The Department treated the petitioner’s previous works as materially different from irrigation-canal restoration and lining works.

The petitioner challenged the rejection of his bid and the award of the contract under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Whether the petitioner’s experience in constructing a flood-water channel and other channel/sewage-related works constituted experience in a “similar work” involving restoration and lining of an irrigation canal under Clause 2.2A(b) of the tender document?

Whether the petitioner could satisfy the tender’s experience requirement merely by establishing that he had executed the prescribed quantities of RCC/PCC and brickwork, notwithstanding the absence of similarity in the nature and purpose of the works?

Whether the Department’s technical evaluation and rejection of the petitioner’s bid warranted interference under Article 226 of the Constitution?

The Court applied Clause 2.2A(b) of the Standard Bidding Document, which required completion of at least one “similar work” and directed that similarity be assessed strictly with reference to the nature, physical size, complexity, methods, technology and other characteristics of the required work.

The quantity requirements under Clause 2.2A(d) could not be read in isolation so as to render the separate “similar work” requirement redundant.

Relying on Afcons Infrastructure Ltd. v. Nagpur Metro Rail Corporation Ltd., (2016) 16 SCC 818, along with the principles reiterated from Central Coalfields Ltd. v. SLL-SML (Joint Venture Consortium), (2016) 8 SCC 622, Dwarkadas Marfatia & Sons v. Port of Bombay, (1989) 3 SCC 293, and Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airport Authority of India, (1979) 3 SCC 489, the Court held that the author of tender conditions is ordinarily the best judge of the project’s requirements and its interpretation should receive judicial deference.

Interference is justified only where the decision is mala fide, arbitrary, irrational, perverse, or reflects a defective decision-making process.

The Court distinguished between the petitioner’s previous works and the tendered work by examining their nature, purpose and functional requirements.

The present contract concerned restoration and lining of an irrigation canal, which is designed to carry and distribute water to agricultural fields.

In contrast, flood-protection works are intended to control or divert floodwater and prevent damage, while sewage or drainage works serve different functional purposes.

Although the works could contain common civil-construction components, such as concrete and brickwork, the common quantities did not establish the required similarity.

Clause 2.2A(d) therefore could not override Clause 2.2A(b), which expressly required experience in a similar work, specifically canal lining in brickwork.

Applying the deferential standard in Afcons Infrastructure, the Court held that the Department’s distinction between irrigation-canal works and flood-water/sewage-related works was neither arbitrary nor perverse.

The Technical Evaluation Committee’s assessment was consequently not amenable to interference under Article 226.

Execution of the stipulated quantities of RCC/PCC and brickwork, without corresponding similarity in the nature and purpose of the work, was insufficient.

The Department’s rejection of the petitioner’s technical bid was found neither mala fide, arbitrary nor perverse.

The writ petition challenging the rejection of the bid and award of the contract to respondent no. 4 was accordingly dismissed.