Termination disputes arising from private contractual employment, without a public law element, are not maintainable under Article 226.

The petitioner worked as a Workshop Assistant/Class-IV at UIT, RGPV, Shivpuri, on a contractual basis through a private outsourcing agency, Scientific Security Management Services Pvt. Ltd.

After his one-day leave request was rejected, the agency issued a warning alleging negligence and unauthorised absence, and terminated his engagement.

The petitioner alleged that he had applied for leave, that his reply was not considered, and that he was not given a proper opportunity to be heard.

He sought quashing of the termination order and reinstatement with consequential benefits.

The State opposed the petition on the ground that the agency was private and the dispute arose from a contractual relationship.

The Court considered maintainability under Article 226 and did not examine the merits of the termination.

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 is maintainable to challenge termination by a private outsourcing agency where the petitioner has shown no statutory right or public-law element in the dispute

Whether the petitioner’s allegations concerning the leave application, warning letter, and failure to consider his reply made the termination dispute amenable to writ review

Article 226 permits writ review of a person or body discharging a public duty or function where the challenged action has a public-law element; it does not ordinarily permit enforcement of purely private contractual rights.

In St. Mary’s Education Society v. Rajendra Prasad Bhargava, (2023) 4 SCC 498, the Supreme Court held that an employee’s service dispute with a body performing public functions is not, without more, amenable to Article 226 where the employment terms are not governed by statutory provisions and the challenged action lacks a public-law element.

In Army Welfare Education Society v. Sunil Kumar Sharma, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 168, relying on Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, the Supreme Court reiterated that a writ may issue against a private body only where a public-law element is present, not to enforce a purely private contract.

The petitioner was not appointed by RGPV or the State; he was engaged through a private outsourcing agency, and the challenged termination concerned that contractual engagement.

He showed neither a statutory right against the agency nor material establishing that it was owned or controlled by the State or was an authority under Article 12.

The fact that he was deployed at RGPV did not alter the agency’s private character.

His complaints about the leave request, warning letter, reply, and termination related to the contractual employer–employee relationship and did not establish a public-law dispute.

The Court therefore declined to assess whether the termination was procedurally or otherwise unlawful.

The petitioner remained free to pursue any other remedy available in law, and the Court expressly stated that it had expressed no opinion on the merits of his claim.