Termination during probation is punitive when founded on definitive misconduct findings from a fact-finding inquiry.

The respondent was appointed as Vice Principal, designated as Principal Grade-II, at Kendriya Vidyalaya, BSF, Gokul Nagar, Tripura, on 10 November 2023, subject to a two-year probation extendable by one year under the 2023 Recruitment Rules. Clause 5 of his Memorandum of Appointment permitted termination during the extended probationary period on the ground of unsatisfactory performance or lack of suitability.

During probation, allegations were made concerning unauthorised absence, unauthorised station leave, manipulation of attendance records, lack of devotion to duty and doubtful integrity. A disciplinary proceeding resulted in a minor penalty of reduction of one pay stage for one year without cumulative effect, together with recovery of salary for the period of unauthorised absence.

His probation was thereafter extended for one year with effect from 10 November 2025.

A fact-finding committee was subsequently constituted. It examined documents, recorded witness statements and obtained the respondent’s written statement. The committee concluded that the allegations were proved and recommended initiation of appropriate disciplinary action.

On 11 April 2025, however, KVS terminated the respondent’s service by invoking Clause 5 of the Memorandum of Appointment and paid him one month’s salary and allowances in lieu of notice.

The respondent challenged the termination before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Guwahati Bench, contending that the termination, though formally couched as termination for unsuitability, was founded on findings of misconduct reached through the fact-finding inquiry without a regular disciplinary proceeding. The Tribunal allowed the original application and directed reinstatement with consequential benefits.

Whether the respondent’s termination under Clause 5 of the Memorandum of Appointment was a valid termination simpliciter during probation, or was punitive and stigmatic because it was founded on findings of misconduct recorded by a fact-finding committee?

Whether the respondent was required to be subjected to a regular departmental inquiry before termination where the employer had obtained definitive findings that the alleged misconduct was proved?

A probationer has no vested right to continue in service and may ordinarily be terminated for general unsuitability during or at the conclusion of probation. An innocuous termination based on an assessment of suitability is not punitive; however, where an inquiry is held to determine the truth of allegations of misconduct, definitive findings of misconduct are recorded, and termination follows on that basis, the termination is punitive and cannot be effected without a regular disciplinary inquiry.

This is the distinction between “motive” and “foundation” explained in Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P., Radhey Shyam Gupta v. U.P. State Agro Industries Corpn. Ltd., Dipti Prakash Banerjee v. Satyendra Nath Bose National Centre for Basic Sciences, V.P. Ahuja v. State of Punjab, and related authorities relied upon by the Tribunal.

Under Pavenendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sciences, an order may be treated as punitive where a formal inquiry into misconduct culminates in a finding of guilt; further, an order is stigmatic when it imputes something beyond ordinary unsuitability for the post.

The substance and effect of the decision-making process, rather than the form or wording of the termination order, is determinative.

The Court held that the termination order could not be viewed in isolation. Although it formally invoked Clause 5 and did not expressly refer to misconduct, it was preceded by a fact-finding inquiry specifically designed to ascertain the truth of allegations against the respondent.

The committee examined witnesses, considered documentary material, obtained the respondent’s explanation, concluded that all allegations were proved and recommended disciplinary action rather than merely reporting that the respondent was unsuitable.

These definitive findings attributed blameworthiness and doubtful integrity to the respondent and therefore constituted the foundation of the termination, not merely its motive.

Since the employer had effectively conducted an inquiry into misconduct and relied upon its conclusions, the respondent could not be terminated under the guise of a simple probationary termination without being afforded the safeguards of a regular departmental inquiry.

The Tribunal’s order dated 12 November 2025 was upheld, and the writ petition was dismissed.

The respondent was directed to be reinstated as a probationer with consequential benefits, including wages for the period of removal, while KVS was granted liberty to initiate a departmental proceeding in accordance with law.

Any interim order passed by the High Court was rescinded.