Termination of a probationer for unsatisfactory performance, without stigma, does not require a departmental inquiry.

The appellant was appointed as an Associate Professor in the Department of Biotechnology, Guru Ghasidas University, by order dated 15 February 2012 and joined on 5 March 2012. His appointment was subject to a two-year probation, extendable by one year, with termination permissible if his performance during probation was found unsatisfactory.

Following an alleged dispute with the then Vice-Chancellor, the appellant lodged a police complaint. Between 25 April and 29 May 2013, the University issued him six show-cause notices concerning alleged misconduct, indiscipline and related matters. His probation was extended by one year on 27 May 2013. However, by order dated 26 August 2013, the University terminated his services on the ground that his performance during probation was unsatisfactory, pursuant to a resolution of the Executive Council dated 24 August 2013.

The appellant contended that the termination was punitive in substance because it was based on allegations of misconduct and was preceded by show-cause notices, but was imposed without a charge-sheet, departmental enquiry or opportunity of hearing.

His writ petition was dismissed by the Single Judge on 11 May 2026, who held that the termination was simpliciter and non-stigmatic and that no departmental enquiry was required for termination of a probationer on account of unsatisfactory performance.

Whether the appellant’s termination, though expressed as termination for unsatisfactory performance during probation, was punitive in substance and therefore required a regular departmental enquiry and compliance with principles of natural justice?

Whether the Single Judge erred in holding that the termination was simpliciter, non-stigmatic and permissible under the appellant’s conditions of appointment?

Whether the Division Bench ought to interfere with the Single Judge’s order in the exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction?

A probationer may be discharged in accordance with the terms of appointment where the employer forms an assessment that the probationer’s performance is unsatisfactory; such termination is ordinarily not punitive and does not require a departmental enquiry unless misconduct is the real foundation of the order rather than merely its background or motive.

The Court relied upon the principle stated in Rajasthan High Court v. Ved Priya, (2021) 13 SCC 151, that termination of a probationer for unsatisfactory performance does not, by itself, attract the requirement of a disciplinary enquiry under Article 311 of the Constitution.

The appellant relied on the “motive versus foundation” principles in Pavanendra Narayan Verma v. Sanjay Gandhi P.G.I. of Medical Sciences, (2002) 1 SCC 520, State of Punjab v. Constable Avtar Singh, (2008) 7 SCC 405, Chandra Prakash Shahi v. State of U.P., (2000) 5 SCC 152, and Dishan Singh Dahariya v. State of Chhattisgarh, W.A. No. 676 of 2022, but the Division Bench found no reason to disturb the Single Judge’s application of the law.

In an intra-court appeal, interference is warranted only where the impugned order discloses a palpable infirmity or perversity.

The Division Bench found that the appointment order expressly permitted termination during probation if the appellant’s performance was unsatisfactory.

It accepted the Single Judge’s view that the termination order merely recorded the unsatisfactory assessment and the Executive Council’s resolution, without containing any allegation of misconduct or stigmatic finding.

Although the appellant relied on the prior show-cause notices and alleged that misconduct was the true foundation of the termination, the Bench did not consider those circumstances sufficient to establish that the order was punitive in character.

Applying the principle in Ved Priya, it held that the termination could be treated as simpliciter and that a departmental enquiry was not mandatory.

The Bench further held that the Single Judge’s reasoning was cogent and that no palpable infirmity or perversity justified appellate interference.

It found no palpable infirmity or perversity in the Single Judge’s judgment dated 11 May 2026.

Accordingly, the writ appeal was dismissed for lack of merit, and the termination order remained undisturbed.