Termination of probationer's service for unsatisfactory performance without notice is valid and not stigmatic.

The applicant, Vinod Kumar Singh, was appointed as Administrative-cum-Finance Officer on a term-contract basis for five years, joining on June 15, 2007, pursuant to an offer of appointment dated May 21, 2007.

His offer of appointment stipulated a probation period of one year, extendable at the discretion of the competent authority, with failure to complete probation rendering him liable for discharge from service.

On November 12, 2008, the respondent No. 2 terminated his services, citing recommendations from a Departmental Promotion Committee (DPC) and the terms of his appointment letter, stating his probation was not successfully completed.

The applicant alleged that the termination was illegal, passed by an incompetent authority, in violation of DOEACC rules, and discriminatory, particularly contending that the concept of probation was inapplicable to his contract/tenure appointment and that a similarly placed employee was regularized.

The respondents contended that the termination was valid, based on the recommendation of a departmental probation clearance committee (not DPC as stated by applicant) due to unsatisfactory performance, and that specific orders for probation confirmation or extension were required.

1. Whether the termination of the applicant's services was illegal or infirm.

2. Whether the termination order was passed by an incompetent authority.

3. Whether the applicant was entitled to regularization of his services.

The court applied principles relating to contractual employment and probation, asserting that an employee is estopped from challenging the terms of an appointment once accepted and acted upon.

It further relied on the Supreme Court's precedents in Chaitanya Prakash and Anr Vs H. Omkarappa, Rajesh Kumar Srivastava Vs State of Jharkhand and Ors, and Muir Mills Unit of NTC (UP) Ltd. Vs Swayam Prakash Srivastava and Anr, which distinguish between stigmatic and non-stigmatic terminations, stating that an order based on unsatisfactory performance during probation is generally not considered stigmatic or punitive and does not require a show cause notice.

These cases also affirmed that non-stigmatic termination of a probationer's services does not require applying principles of audi alteram partem.

The court found no illegality or infirmity in the termination order.

It noted that the applicant had accepted the offer of appointment, which clearly stipulated a one-year probation period extendable at the discretion of the competent authority, and explicitly stated that failure to complete it would lead to discharge.

The court emphasized that by accepting these conditions and joining duty, the applicant was estopped from challenging the probation terms later, especially after his services were terminated.

The court clarified that the termination was based on the recommendation of a committee reviewing his performance during probation, not a DPC as alleged by the applicant, and that a specific order was necessary for probation confirmation or extension.

Applying the cited Supreme Court precedents, the court reasoned that termination due to unsatisfactory probation performance is a termination simpliciter and not stigmatic or punitive, thus not requiring a show-cause notice.

The argument regarding the termination being by an incompetent authority was rejected as the Director was deemed competent, and no evidence was provided to the contrary.

Consequently, since the termination was found to be valid, the claim for regularization, which was contingent upon setting aside the termination, was also dismissed.

The court found that the applicant, having accepted the terms of his appointment, was estopped from challenging the probation clause, and the termination was a valid exercise of power due to unsatisfactory probation, not requiring a show cause notice as it was non-stigmatic.

Therefore, the effect and operation of the impugned order remain intact, and the relief sought for regularization was also denied.