Territorial jurisdiction for guardianship and custody ordinarily lies where the protected person resides.

The petitioner sought appointment as the permanent guardian of Ms. Rubina Sultan, an approximately 70-year-old woman with intellectual and locomotor disabilities, in respect of her person and property.

She also sought her physical custody, production of her original documents, correction of her disability certificate, release of funds, and protection of her assets.

Ms. Sultan had allegedly been removed from the family’s ancestral premises at Ballimaran, Delhi, by respondent no. 7 in 2011 and had since been residing with him at Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh.

The petitioner relied upon the location of Ms. Sultan’s assets in Delhi, the Delhi address reflected in her Aadhaar card, the issuance of her disability certificate by a Delhi hospital, and earlier proceedings before the Delhi High Court to invoke its territorial jurisdiction.

The respondents objected that the petitioner, respondent no. 7, and Ms. Sultan all resided in Uttar Pradesh, and that the principal reliefs concerned Ms. Sultan’s custody, care, welfare, and guardianship, requiring factual and medical inquiry at Ghaziabad.

Whether the Delhi High Court had territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to entertain a petition seeking guardianship, custody, care, and related reliefs concerning a person residing continuously at Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh?

Whether the location of Ms. Sultan’s assets in Delhi, the issuance of her disability certificate in Delhi, the presence of Delhi authorities, and earlier Delhi proceedings constituted an integral part of the cause of action or otherwise justified exercise of jurisdiction by the Delhi High Court?

Whether, even assuming that some part of the cause of action arose in Delhi, the Delhi High Court should decline jurisdiction on the ground of forum conveniens?

Article 226(1) empowers a High Court to issue writs within its territorial jurisdiction, while Article 226(2) permits exercise of jurisdiction where the cause of action arises wholly or partly within that territory.

“Cause of action” comprises the bundle of material facts necessary for obtaining the relief, and a fact must have a material, essential, or integral nexus with the relief claimed to confer jurisdiction.

The Court relied on State of Goa v. Summit Online Trade Solutions (P) Ltd., (2023) 7 SCC 791; Alchemist Ltd. v. State Bank of Sikkim, (2007) 11 SCC 335; and Oil & Natural Gas Commission v. Utpal Kumar Basu, (1994) 4 SCC 711, concerning the integral-fact test for territorial jurisdiction.

It further applied Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254, and Sterling Agro Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 3162, which establish that even where part of the cause of action arises within a High Court’s territory, the Court may decline to exercise discretionary jurisdiction under the doctrine of forum conveniens.

The Court held that the principal relief was not the management of any Delhi property but the appointment of a guardian for Ms. Sultan’s person and estate, together with custody, care, and welfare-related directions.

Since Ms. Sultan had resided in Ghaziabad for over fifteen years, respondent no. 7 also resided there, and the petitioner herself resided in Noida, none of the parties directly concerned with the principal relief was located in Delhi.

Determining guardianship would require inquiry into Ms. Sultan’s living arrangements, care, medical condition, support, and wishes, as well as any necessary medical assessment; these inquiries would necessarily take place at Ghaziabad.

The Delhi location of assets was merely consequential to the guardianship claim and was not an integral part of the cause of action.

Similarly, the disability certificate issued in Delhi was treated as an antecedent fact, particularly because no independent substantive challenge had been raised against the issuing authority and any current assessment would have to be conducted where Ms. Sultan resided.

The presence of Delhi authorities and the existence of earlier Delhi proceedings could not, by themselves, confer jurisdiction in a subsequent proceeding involving a different cause of action.

In any event, Ghaziabad was the more appropriate and effective forum because the relevant factual inquiry and implementation of any custody or care order would occur there.

The petition was accordingly dismissed on the ground of territorial jurisdiction, and the pending applications, including the interim custody application, were disposed of.

The Court expressly clarified that it had not adjudicated the merits of the allegations or the petitioner’s entitlement to guardianship, and granted liberty to pursue appropriate remedies before the competent court or authority having jurisdiction over Ghaziabad.