The 1995 Haryana amendment abolishing co-sharer pre-emption rights does not affect pending appeals after trial decrees.

The appellant-plaintiff, Samunder Singh, filed a suit for possession by way of pre-emption concerning 6 kanals 16 marlas of agricultural land sold by defendant No. 2, a co-sharer, to defendant No. 1 for ₹1,00,000 through a sale deed dated 16.11.1992.

The plaintiff claimed a superior right of pre-emption as a co-sharer.

Defendant No. 1 admitted the co-sharer relationship and the sale but contested the plaintiff’s entitlement.

The trial Court, relying on the jamabandi, mutation and the vendee’s admission that the land was joint, decreed the suit on 22.10.1994.

During the pendency of the vendee’s first appeal, Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 was amended by the Haryana Amendment Act No. 10 of 1995, effective from 07.07.1995, abolishing the co-sharer’s right of pre-emption in agricultural land.

The First Appellate Court treated the amendment as applicable to the pending appeal and dismissed the suit on 05.04.1996.

Whether the Haryana Amendment Act No. 10 of 1995, which abolished the co-sharer’s right of pre-emption, operated retrospectively so as to affect a pending appeal against a decree already passed in favour of the pre-emptor?

Whether the plaintiff’s right of pre-emption, which existed when the suit was instituted and when the trial Court passed its decree, continued during the pendency of the appeal?

Whether the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court dismissing the pre-emption suit were sustainable?

The Court applied Section 15 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, as amended by the Haryana Amendment Act No. 10 of 1995.

Relying principally on the Constitution Bench decision in Shyam Sunder v. Ram Kumar, 2001 (3) RCR (Civil) 754; 2001 AIR SC 2472, the Court held that the 1995 amendment was prospective and neither expressly nor impliedly intended to affect accrued rights or pending litigation.

The Court followed Didar Singh v. Ishar Singh, 2001 (8) SCC 52, which held that the pre-emptor must possess the right up to the date of the trial Court’s decree, and that a subsequent statutory alteration during the appeal does not defeat the decree.

The contrary view in Ramjilal v. Ghisa Ram, 1996 (7) SCC 507—that an appeal is a continuation of the suit and that the right must exist until final appellate adjudication—was held to have been overruled by Shyam Sunder.

The same principle was reiterated in Pirthi v. Mohan Singh, 2011 (9) SCC 107.

The plaintiff’s status as a co-sharer and the joint nature of the land were established before the trial Court through the revenue records and the vendee’s admission.

Consequently, the plaintiff possessed a valid statutory right of pre-emption when the sale took place and when the decree was passed on 22.10.1994.

Since the Haryana amendment came into force only on 07.07.1995, after the trial Court’s decree and during the pendency of the appeal, Shyam Sunder required the Court to treat the amendment as prospective and not apply it to the accrued right or the pending litigation.

The First Appellate Court therefore erred in treating the appeal as requiring re-evaluation of the plaintiff’s right under the amended Section 15.

The reliance placed by the respondent on Punyadeo Sharma v. Kamla Devi, 2022 LawFinder (SC) 27, was misplaced because that case concerned a distinct statutory amendment which expressly abated pending proceedings, unlike the Haryana amendment.

The judgment and decree dated 05.04.1996 passed by the First Appellate Court were set aside, and the trial Court’s decree dated 22.10.1994 was restored.

The plaintiff was held entitled to possession by way of pre-emption, subject to depositing or paying the entire sale consideration in accordance with the trial Court’s decree; any unpaid amount was directed to be deposited.