The petitioner bears the burden of proving matrimonial cruelty through cogent evidence rather than uncorroborated allegations.

The parties were married on November 11, 1997, and have two surviving children.

They began residing separately on April 11, 2004.

The Respondent-husband filed a petition for divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act (HMA) on January 19, 2006, alleging mental and physical cruelty.

The Appellant-wife subsequently filed for restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the HMA.

On November 28, 2011, the Family Court granted the divorce decree and dismissed the Appellant's petition.

The Respondent remarried in 2012 following the expiry of the limitation period for appeal.

The Appellant challenged the divorce decree, contending that the alleged instances of cruelty—including a 2003 attempt to set the house ablaze, a 2004 slip containing "whimsical demands," and a 2005 physical assault—were unsubstantiated and based on procedural errors.

1. Whether the Respondent-husband successfully proved instances of "cruelty" sufficient to dissolve the marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the HMA.

2. Whether the Family Court’s exercise of power under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act to compare handwriting without expert opinion or notice to the parties was procedurally valid.

3. Whether the burden of proof was correctly applied in the matrimonial proceedings.

The court applied Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, defining cruelty as conduct "grave and weighty" enough to make cohabitation intolerable, beyond "ordinary wear and tear".

Relying on A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, the court noted that cruelty must be assessed cumulatively.

Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, was scrutinized regarding the court’s power to compare handwriting, emphasizing that such power must be exercised sparingly and in accordance with natural justice.

Finally, the court applied the principle from Roopa Soni v. Kamalnarayan Soni that the burden of proof in divorce petitions lies on the petitioner based on the "preponderance of probability".

The High Court found that the Respondent failed to provide independent evidence, such as neighbor testimonies or medical records, to prove the 2003 gas-burning incident.

Regarding the 2004 handwritten "demand slip," the Court held that the Family Court’s comparison under Section 73 of the Evidence Act was "critically flawed" as it was done without informing the parties of the purpose or seeking expert assistance; furthermore, drawing an adverse inference from the wife’s hesitation was a violation of natural justice.

Regarding the 2005 assault, the Court noted that the AIIMS medical report (MLC) did not identify the assailants and that the Respondent’s testimony alone was insufficient, especially since he had visited the Appellant's residence after a long separation.

The Court also dismissed allegations regarding the Appellant's refusal of sexual intercourse and use of anti-pregnancy pills, noting that the birth of children and lack of specific pill names rendered the claims "baseless".

The Court concluded that the Family Court erroneously shifted the burden of proof onto the wife to disprove allegations rather than requiring the husband to prove them.

The High Court further held that the Respondent’s remarriage did not bar the setting aside of an erroneously passed decree.

The appeal was allowed, and the judgment and decree of divorce dated November 28, 2011, were set aside.

No relief was granted regarding the Section 9 HMA petition as it was not sought.