There is no presumption that property is joint-family property; the claimant bears the burden of proof.

The plaintiffs, three brothers, sought partition of two properties, claiming that the family had remained joint until 1990, that Item No. 2 was ancestral property, and that Item No. 1 had been purchased in Kariappan’s name in 1978 using income from the ancestral property.

Kariappan was their brother and the husband and father of the first and second defendants, respectively.

The defendants maintained that Item No. 1 was Kariappan’s self-acquired property and that no property corresponding to Item No. 2 existed.

The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that Item No. 1 belonged to Kariappan and that the plaintiffs had not established the existence of Item No. 2; the first appellate court affirmed.

The plaintiffs’ second appeal challenged those concurrent findings.

1. Whether the plaintiffs proved that Item No. 1 was joint family property, rather than Kariappan’s separate property, so as to be available for partition.

2. Whether the plaintiffs established the existence of Item No. 2 and their entitlement to a share in it.

3. Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below disclosed a basis for interference in a second appeal under Section 100 CPC.

Under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, interference with concurrent findings of fact is limited; reappreciation is not warranted unless, for example, the findings are perverse, based on no evidence, or reached without considering vital evidence, and the matter involves a substantial question of law.

The plaintiffs bear the burden of proving their claim, and there is no presumption that property is joint family property; the party asserting that character must establish it (Markhan Singh (Dead) by LRs. v. Kulwant Singh, (2007) 10 SCC 602).

A document affecting relinquishment of rights in immovable property requires compulsory registration, as discussed in Yellapu Uma Maheshwari v. Buddha Jagadheeswararao, (2015) 16 SCC 787.

The Court also stated that documentary evidence would prevail over oral evidence in the circumstances of this case.

The Court found that Ex. A1, the sale deed for Item No. 1, contained no recital indicating joint-family ownership, and the plaintiffs had not examined the vendors or their legal heirs to establish that the consideration came from joint-family income.

Ex. A2, said to be Kariappan’s notarised affidavit acknowledging joint-family status, was not proved by establishing his signature or otherwise corroborating its contents; the remaining plaintiffs’ exhibits also did not establish that status.

The evidence of exclusive possession and the plaintiffs’ own testimony concerning separately held properties supported the concurrent finding that the parties acquired and held properties separately.

The plaintiffs also failed to prove that Item No. 2 existed.

The Court held that the asserted inconsistencies in DW1’s evidence about Kariappan’s age at the time of the purchase did not discharge the plaintiffs’ burden or justify disturbing the factual findings.

It found no perversity, legal infirmity, or other ground for second-appeal interference.

It awarded costs to the defendants throughout and closed the connected miscellaneous petition.