Threats without intent to cause alarm do not constitute criminal intimidation.

The complainant alleged that on 12 February 2017, he received a telephone call from mobile number 9510807498 from a person identifying himself as Sanjaybhai, the present applicant.

The caller allegedly stated that he had transferred Arvindbhai’s land into his own name, abused the complainant, and handed the phone to another person who also abused and threatened him with dire consequences if he entered the land.

The applicant allegedly resumed the conversation, threatened to assault and kill the complainant, and stated that the mobile number belonged to him.

The complainant lodged FIR I-C.R. No. II-12 of 2017 at Chikhli Police Station for offences under Sections 506(2) read with 114 of the IPC.

The applicant sought quashing of the FIR under Section 482 of the CrPC, contending that the allegations were false, that the mobile number had not been verified, and that the essential ingredients of criminal intimidation were absent.

The State opposed quashing, arguing that the investigation should be permitted to determine whether the mobile number belonged to the applicant.

Whether the allegations in the FIR, taken at face value, disclosed the essential ingredients of criminal intimidation under Sections 503 and 506(2) of the IPC.

Whether the alleged delay of approximately 21 hours in lodging the FIR and the complainant’s continuation of his routine activities indicated that no alarm was caused, warranting exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.

Whether the FIR and consequential proceedings should be quashed qua the applicant.

The Court applied Section 482 of the CrPC, which empowers the High Court to quash criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice.

Under Section 503 of the IPC, criminal intimidation requires a threat of injury to a person, reputation, or property, accompanied by an intention to cause alarm or to compel the threatened person to do or omit an act.

Section 506(2) prescribes enhanced punishment where the threat concerns death or grievous hurt, among other specified consequences.

Relying on Vikram Johar v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2019) 14 SCC 207, and Manik Taneja v. State of Karnataka, (2015) 7 SCC 423, the Court held that a mere expression of threatening words or abuse, without the requisite intention to cause alarm, does not constitute criminal intimidation.

The Court also referred to Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44, for the principle that allegations must disclose the statutory ingredients of the offence at a prima facie level.

The Court observed that, even if the FIR allegations were accepted as true, they merely indicated that the alleged threats were made to prevent the complainant from visiting the disputed land; they did not disclose that the complainant was actually placed under alarm or genuinely apprehended that the threats would be carried out.

The complainant allegedly continued his routine professional activities the next morning and lodged the FIR approximately 21 hours after the telephone conversation, which, according to the Court, supported the inference that the threats had not caused the alarm required under Section 503 IPC.

Consequently, even assuming that the applicant had made the threats, the FIR lacked allegations or material establishing the necessary intention to cause alarm and therefore did not satisfy the essential ingredients of Sections 503 or 506(2) IPC.

The unresolved question of whether the mobile number belonged to the applicant did not justify continuation of proceedings where the allegations themselves failed to constitute the alleged offence.

The application under Section 482 CrPC was allowed, and FIR I-C.R. No. II-12 of 2017 registered with Chikhli Police Station, together with all consequential proceedings, was quashed and set aside qua the applicant.

Rule was made absolute.