Time consumed in stamp duty adjudication must be excluded when computing limitation for document registration.

The Petitioner, a successor entity to a company under the BIFR revival scheme, sought a Writ of Mandamus directing the Respondent authorities to register orders passed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR) dated 26th February 2007 and 3rd January 2013.

Under the SICA Act, these orders vested certain immovable properties in the Petitioner effective 1st April 2006.

A dispute arose regarding stamp duty, leading to protracted litigation that concluded only on 8th July 2024, when the Appellate Authority determined the duty to be a nominal ₹100/-.

When the Petitioner presented the documents for registration on 22nd August 2024, the Sub-Registrar refused, citing the expiry of the four-to-eight-month limitation period under Section 23 of the Registration Act, 1908.

Sections 23 and 25 of the Registration Act, 1908, which prescribe a four-month limit (extendable by four months) for document presentation.

Section 32 of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA), which gives overriding effect to sanctioned schemes.

Limitation cannot run while a document is legally incapable of registration due to pending stamp adjudication as established in Nestor Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra and Purnima Bhanuprasad Gohil v. State of Maharashtra.

The Doctrine of Merger from Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala and the legal maxims actus curiae neminem gravabit (an act of the court shall prejudice no man) and lex non cogit ad impossibilia (the law does not compel the impossible).

The Court reasoned that a document not "duly stamped" is incapable of lawful registration; therefore, the limitation period for presentation under the Registration Act is arrested during the pendency of stamp duty adjudication.

The Court rejected the State's argument that the Petitioner should have presented the document in an unstamped form to be impounded, noting that judicial reasoning cannot compel procedural formalism where the State itself asserted inconsistent positions.

Under the Doctrine of Merger, the initial 2015 adjudication order ceased to exist independently once merged into the final 2024 appellate order; thus, the document only became legally "registrable" in July 2024.

The Court held that since the delay was "State-induced" and "institutional," the State was barred from taking advantage of its own wrong to deny registration under Article 14.

The Court directed the Registering Authorities to accept the BIFR orders and the declaration-cum-indemnity for registration within four weeks, excluding the entire period spent in stamp adjudication and related litigation; Petitioner was granted liberty to seek mutation of revenue records separately.