Time extension for investigation under Section 43-D(2)(b) UAPA, granted with legal representation, precludes accrual of default bail.

In brief

The question

Whether the order extending the investigation period to 180 days was void due to the non-production of the accused and the alleged lack of an independent Public Prosecutor's report

The court held

The High Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the extension order was legally sustainable and not "mechanical"

It also directed

The Court concluded that since the investigation period was validly extended to 180 days before the initial 90 days lapsed, no right to default bail under Section 187 BNSS / 167(2) CrPC had accrued to the appellant on 14.10.2025

The rejection of the bail application by the Special Judge was upheld as legally sound

01Facts

The appellant, a former Sarpanch with no criminal antecedents, was arrested on 16.07.2025 in connection with FIR No. 16/2022 for offences under the IPC, Arms Act, and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA)

p. 3, 4

The statutory 90-day period for investigation was set to expire on 14.10.2025

p. 4

On 07.10.2025, the Special Judge (NIA Act) granted an extension of the investigation period from 90 to 180 days under Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, based on a report citing pending arrests of co-accused and awaited statutory sanctions

p. 5

The appellant, represented by counsel but not physically produced during the extension hearing, subsequently applied for default bail on 17.10.2025 under Section 187 of the BNSS (corresponding to Section 167(2) CrPC)

p. 5, 6

The Special Judge rejected the bail application, prompting this appeal

p. 5

02Issues

i.Whether the order extending the investigation period to 180 days was void due to the non-production of the accused and the alleged lack of an independent Public Prosecutor's report

p. 6, 7

ii.Whether the appellant’s indefeasible right to default bail under Section 187 BNSS / 167(2) CrPC accrued upon the expiry of the initial 90-day period

p. 8, 9

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 43-D(2)(b) of the UAPA, which modifies Section 167(2) of the CrPC to allow extension of remand up to 180 days if the Court is satisfied by a Public Prosecutor's report indicating investigative progress and specific reasons for detention

p. 13

Principles from *Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra* regarding the requirement of an independent prosecutorial report.

p. 7

Principles from *State of Maharashtra v. Surendra Pundlik Gadling* regarding the requirement of an independent prosecutorial report.

p. 7

The Court also addressed *Jigar alias Jimmy Pravinchandra Adatiya v. State of Gujarat* regarding the necessity of producing the accused during remand extensions

p. 6

*M. Ravindran v. Intelligence Officer* concerning the nature of the indefeasible right to default bail

p. 8

Provisions in the judgment · 19 · Linked ones open on LawLens

National Investigation Agency Act, 2008 Section 21

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 147 Section 148 Section 149 Section 307 Section 506

Arms Act, 1959 Section 25 Section 27

Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 Section 17 Section 18 Section 19 Section 23 Section 38 Section 39 Section 40 Section 45

Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Section 187

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 167 Section 173

04Reasoning

The Court reasoned that the extension order dated 07.10.2025 was valid as it was passed prior to the expiry of the 90-day limit

p. 18

It found that the Special Judge had perused the case diary and the progress report, satisfying the statutory mandate of "judicial satisfaction" regarding the complexity of the Naxalite-related investigation

p. 18, 19

Addressing the procedural challenge, the Court noted that while the appellant was not physically produced, he was represented by counsel who raised no objection at the time of the extension

p. 14, 19

The Court distinguished the cited precedents by noting that the "indefeasible right" to bail is conditional; once a valid extension is granted under a special statute like the UAPA, the statutory period for "default" is legally enlarged, thereby preventing the right from crystallizing at the 90-day mark

p. 22, 23