Time may be the essence of an immovable-property contract when fixed by the parties.

The plaintiff sought specific performance of an agreement of sale dated 25 February 1990.

The defendants resisted, asserting that the plaintiff had failed to complete the transaction within the stipulated period, including after extensions.

The trial court found that the plaintiff had not established readiness and willingness and granted the alternative relief of refund of the advance; the first appellate court affirmed.

The plaintiff appealed under Section 100 CPC, arguing, among other things, that time was not the essence of a contract concerning immovable property and that delay was attributable to the defendants.

The order dated 29 September 2026 corrected the appearance entry for counsel for respondents 9–11; it did not revisit the merits.

Whether time could be treated as the essence of the agreement for sale of immovable property where the agreement fixed a time limit.

Whether the concurrent findings of the courts below disclosed a substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC.

Under Section 100 CPC, a second appeal lies only where a substantial question of law is involved.

The Court relied on Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, 2011 (4) CTC 640, and Padmakumari v. Dasayyan, 2015 (6) CTC 545, for the principle that time may be of the essence in a contract for sale of immovable property where the parties have agreed to a time limit.

The Court also applied the requirement that a purchaser seeking specific performance establish readiness and willingness to perform the contract.

The agreement fixed a time for performance, and the courts below had found that the plaintiff failed to complete his obligations despite extensions on two occasions.

Applying the cited authorities, the Court rejected the contention that time could not be essential merely because the contract concerned immovable property.

It accepted the concurrent assessment that the plaintiff had not demonstrated readiness and willingness and found no substantial question of law justifying appellate intervention.

It dismissed the second appeal, left the concurrent decrees—including the alternative relief of refund—undisturbed, made no order as to costs, and closed the connected miscellaneous petition.