Time Pursuing Review of an Eviction Order Does Not Automatically Merge Orders for Limitation Purposes

The respondent-landlady (since deceased) filed an eviction petition against the petitioner/tenant under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRCA) for the bona fide requirement of her grandson's office.

The Rent Controller (RC) passed an eviction order on 06.07.2020.

The petitioner subsequently filed a review petition before the RC on 27.07.2020, seeking to bring on record new evidence regarding the grandson's employment and property ownership.

The review application was dismissed on 25.09.2025.

The petitioner then erroneously challenged this dismissal before the Rent Control Tribunal (RCT) under Section 38 of the DRCA on 04.12.2025, despite the RCT questioning its maintainability on the first hearing.

The appeal was withdrawn on 27.03.2026 with liberty to seek appropriate remedies.

Consequently, the petitioner filed the present revision petition along with a delay condonation application for the 388-day delay in challenging the original 2020 eviction order.

1. Whether the period spent pursuing a review application and a subsequent (but unsuccessful/withdrawn) appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal can be excluded for the purposes of limitation in filing a revision petition under Section 25B(8) of the DRCA.

2. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for the time spent challenging the review order before the RCT.

Section 25B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, which provides for a revision petition to the High Court.

The limitation for such a revision is 3 years under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, as noted in Jai Prakash v. Jean Conea.

Doctrine from DSR Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan: when a review petition is dismissed, the original decree remains the challengeable order and does not merge with the review dismissal, though diligent pursuit of review may be a ground for condonation.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which requires a party to show they prosecuted a prior proceeding in "good faith" and for the "same relief" before a court lacking jurisdiction to obtain a limitation exclusion.

The court observed that while the petitioner was entitled to the COVID-19 extension (up to 28.02.2022) per the Supreme Court’s In Re: Cognizance on Extension of Limitation, the limitation to challenge the 2020 order expired on 28.02.2025.

The present petition filed in March 2026 remained time-barred by 180 days even excluding the time until the review was dismissed (25.09.2025).

The court rejected the plea for further exclusion under Section 14 regarding the RCT appeal because moving the RCT against a review dismissal was not for the "same relief" as challenging the original 2020 eviction judgment.

The "good faith" requirement was not met because the RCT had flagged the maintainability issue on 04.12.2025, yet the petitioner persisted with the wrong forum for months.

The court concluded that the petitioner failed to explain why the primary eviction order was not challenged immediately after the review dismissal.

The court dismissed the application for condonation of delay (CM APPL. 21311/2026) regarding the challenge to the eviction order dated 06.07.2020 and listed the petition for hearing on remaining prayers ('c' and 'd') relating to the review and execution orders for 24.08.2026.