Transfer orders warrant judicial interference only for mala fides, statutory violations, or lack of authority.

The appellant, an Assistant Teacher (L.B.), challenged her transfer order dated 31.05.2025, by which she was transferred approximately 65 kilometres from her existing place of posting.

In Writ Petition (S) No. 4948 of 2025, the learned Single Judge initially granted interim protection and, on 27.02.2026, directed the State respondents to file a reply.

No written reply was filed by the State.

When the writ petition was subsequently dismissed on 20.07.2026, the learned Single Judge relied upon the decision in Shashi Shrivastava v. State of Chhattisgarh & Others, W.A. No. 674 of 2025, decided on 18.09.2025.

The appellant preferred the present intra-Court appeal, contending that the writ petition ought not to have been dismissed without a written reply from the State.

Whether the learned Single Judge erred in dismissing the writ petition without insisting upon a written reply from the State respondents, despite the direction dated 27.02.2026 to file such reply?

Whether the appellant’s transfer order warranted judicial interference in the absence of a plea or proof of mala fides, violation of statutory rules, or lack of competence of the transferring authority?

Transfer is ordinarily an incidence of service, and courts should not interfere with a transfer or posting order unless it is vitiated by mala fides, lack of competence, or infringement of statutory rules or regulations.

Teacher Rationalization Instructions are treated as guidelines and do not supplant the employer’s general statutory power to transfer an employee in public interest or administrative exigency.

The Court also applied the principle that a procedural objection regarding non-filing of a written reply will not, by itself, justify appellate interference where the substance of the State’s position was placed before the Court and the appellant cannot demonstrate what material or defence would have emerged from the written reply.

The Division Bench acknowledged that the State had not filed a formal written reply despite the order dated 27.02.2026.

However, the State had relied upon Shashi Shrivastava, and the appellant did not dispute that the factual and legal issues were substantially similar.

The appellant also did not challenge the Single Judge’s findings on mala fides, statutory violation, or the relevant transfer principles, nor could she identify any specific fact or defence that would have emerged from a written reply and altered the result.

The Court therefore held that the direction to file a reply had been effectively complied with in substance by placing the applicable precedent before the Single Judge.

Since the transfer challenge disclosed no recognised ground for judicial interference and the reasoning in Shashi Shrivastava applied, the impugned dismissal was neither infirm nor perverse.

It held that the absence of a formal written reply did not invalidate the Single Judge’s decision because the State’s legal position had been presented and the appellant failed to show resulting prejudice.

It further held that the transfer order was not liable to be interfered with in the absence of mala fides, statutory breach, or lack of authority.

Finding no infirmity or perversity in the order dated 20.07.2026, the Division Bench dismissed the writ appeal.