An appellate authority cannot invalidate appointments without giving affected appointees notice and hearing.

The petitioner Managing Committee was affiliated with the Bihar State Madarsa Education Board, and petitioners 2–5 were stated to have been appointed as Head Moulvi and Assistant Teachers of the Madarsa.

Following rival claims concerning the constitution of the Managing Committee and allegations of misappropriation, the District Education Officer, Begusarai conducted an enquiry and recommended approval of the existing Committee.

The Madarsa Board consequently approved the petitioner Committee for three years by Letter No. 1716-26 dated 28 March 2017.

That approval was challenged in Appeal No. 26 of 2017 before the Special Secretary-cum-Appellate Authority, Education Department.

When the appeal was taken up on 18 May 2022, the parties informed the appellate authority that it had become infructuous because the Committee’s tenure had expired.

Nevertheless, the appellate authority passed Letter No. 120 dated 16 August 2023, set aside the Board’s approval, questioned the District Education Officer’s report, and declared the appointments of petitioners 2–5 invalid, although they had neither been impleaded nor given notice or an opportunity of hearing.

Pursuant to that order, the Madarsa Board issued consequential Memo No. 507 dated 06 March 2024.

Whether the Special Secretary-cum-Appellate Authority acted within jurisdiction in deciding an appeal that had allegedly become infructuous after expiry of the Managing Committee’s tenure?

Whether the appellate authority could declare the appointments of petitioners 2–5 invalid without issuing them notice or granting them an opportunity of hearing?

Whether the appellate authority was justified in setting aside the Madarsa Board’s approval on the basis of observations concerning the District Education Officer’s report, although that report was not under challenge or on the appellate record?

Whether the consequential order of the Madarsa Board dated 06 March 2024 could survive after the appellate order was set aside?

The Court applied the principles of natural justice, particularly the audi alteram partem rule, holding that an administrative or quasi-judicial order adversely affecting a person’s rights cannot be passed without prior notice and a meaningful opportunity of hearing.

It further applied the rule that an appellate authority must act within the limits of its jurisdiction and cannot grant relief against persons who were not parties to the proceedings or decide matters not properly before it.

The Court also recognised that an appeal may lose practical significance when the tenure or subject matter in dispute has expired, and that a consequential order cannot survive once the foundational order on which it is based is quashed.

No specific statutory provision or judicial precedent was cited in the judgment; the decision principally rests on jurisdictional limits, procedural fairness, and natural justice.

The Court found that the appellate authority exceeded its jurisdiction by proceeding with the appeal despite being informed that the Managing Committee’s tenure had expired and the dispute had become infructuous.

More importantly, the declaration that the appointments of petitioners 2–5 were invalid directly prejudiced their rights, yet they had not been made parties, served notice, or given an opportunity to explain their position.

The appellate authority also relied on alleged deficiencies in the District Education Officer’s report even though the report was not under challenge and, according to the Court, was not on the appellate record.

These defects constituted a serious violation of natural justice and demonstrated non-application of mind.

Since the Madarsa Board’s later order merely implemented the impugned appellate order, its validity depended entirely on that order.

The Court accordingly set aside the appellate order and, as a necessary consequence, also set aside the Madarsa Board’s Memo No. 507 dated 06 March 2024.

The writ petition was allowed.

The Court clarified that its order would not prejudice the intervenor’s right to pursue the separate pending proceedings in CWJC Nos. 13842 of 2018 and 13946 of 2018.