A State cannot relitigate a title claim in execution after losing it on merits.

The respondent’s predecessors obtained decrees dated 12 November 2005 declaring their ownership and possession over Plots Nos. 128 and 129, based on a 1942 Kabala executed by the Nawab of Loharu. The decrees were affirmed in first and second appeals and attained finality.

The respondent subsequently purchased the properties through a registered sale deed dated 14 March 2019 and continued the execution proceedings seeking possession.

The State, which was not a party to the original suits, filed objections under Order XXI Rules 97–99 CPC, claiming that the decretal land formed part of State-owned Khasra No. 735 and that a Government primary school existed on part of the property.

It alleged that the decrees had been obtained by fraud and relied on a demarcation report dated 10 April 2021, prepared without an order of the Executing Court or notice to the decree-holder.

The Executing Court dismissed the State’s objections on 12 July 2023, holding that possession could be restored under Order XXI Rule 32(5) CPC where the decree-holder had been dispossessed after an injunction decree.

The appellate Court dismissed the State’s appeal on 29 September 2023, while directing that execution concerning any portion within the school premises be conducted in the presence of the District Elementary Education Officer and the Tehsildar.

The State had also previously instituted suits seeking cancellation of the 2005 decrees on the ground that the land formed part of Khasra No. 735. Those suits were dismissed after trial and appellate proceedings, including dismissal of the second appeal concerning Plot No. 128 by the High Court and dismissal of the related SLP by the Supreme Court.

The Court applied Order XXI Rules 97–99 CPC, under which a stranger or third-party objector in execution must establish an independent right, title, or possession sufficient to resist execution.

It considered Order XXI Rule 32(5) CPC and the principle that possession may, in appropriate circumstances, be restored to a decree-holder dispossessed after an injunction decree.

Section 11 CPC was applied to bar re-litigation of an issue that had been directly and substantially in issue, heard, and finally decided between the parties.

The Court also relied on the broader doctrine against abuse of process recognised in K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi, (1998) 3 SCC 573, and discussed Sharada Sanghi v. Asha Agarwal, 2026 INSC 292, concerning the impermissibility of reopening through execution issues previously pursued in separate proceedings.

Allegations of fraud were governed by Order VI Rule 4 CPC and Bishundeo Narain v. Seogeni Rai, AIR 1951 SC 280, which require full and specific particulars and proof of fraud.

The Court also relied on Satyawati v. Rajinder Singh, (2013) 9 SCC 491, regarding the entitlement of decree-holders to obtain the fruits of their decrees without being obstructed by repetitive execution objections.

The Court held that the State’s challenge to the mode of execution did not assist it because the State was not claiming through the judgment-debtors or the vegetable vendors whose possession had earlier been found insufficient; it asserted an independent claim of State ownership.

Consequently, the determinative question was whether the State had proved a right, title, or possession capable of defeating the decree-holder’s claim.

The State had already pursued the identical Khasra No. 735 claim in its own suits concerning both plots, where evidence was led and the courts found that it had failed to prove the connection between the decretal land and Khasra No. 735.

Those findings attained finality and attracted Section 11 CPC, preventing the State from raising the same issue again through execution objections.

The 2021 demarcation report could not alter that conclusion because it was procured unilaterally, without authorisation of the Executing Court or notice to the decree-holder, and had not been judicially tested.

The allegation of fraud was also rejected as vague and unsupported by specific particulars or evidence.

Finally, the State’s grievance that it had been denied an opportunity to lead evidence was untenable because its application for framing issues had already been dismissed on 17 January 2023 and that order had not been challenged.

The limited concern regarding the approximately seven-foot portion allegedly falling within the Government school premises was adequately addressed by the direction requiring execution in the presence of the competent education and revenue officers.

It held that the State had neither established an independent right, title, or possession nor shown any basis for reopening the concluded determination that the decretal land formed part of Khasra No. 735.

The State’s objections were barred by the principles of res judicata and abuse of process, and no substantial question of law arose in the Execution Second Appeals.

ESA Nos. 11 and 12 of 2024 were accordingly dismissed.

The direction that execution in the area of the Government primary school be conducted in the presence of the District Elementary Education Officer and the Tehsildar was allowed to continue.

Pending applications, including applications for stay and condonation of delay, were disposed of.