Tribunals lack inherent power to refund statutory fees absent express legislative provision under the SARFAESI Act.

The Respondents (borrowers) filed an application under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) challenging auction notices issued by Union Bank of India, paying a court fee of ₹79,225/-

During the pendency of the proceedings, the borrowers settled the entire debt, and the loan was regularized.

Consequently, they filed an application for refund of the court fee under Section 22(2)(h) of the RDB Act, which the DRT rejected due to the absence of express statutory provisions for refund under the SARFAESI Act.

A Single Judge of the High Court set aside the DRT’s order, directing a refund based on "inherent equitable rights" and Rule 4 of the DRT (Refund of Court Fee) Rules, 2013.

The Registrar of the DRT appealed this decision.

The Court applied Section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, regarding the maintainability of appeals from original jurisdictions.

It relied on the principle from *Padam Sen v. State of U.P.* and *K.K. Velusamy v. N. Palanisamy* that inherent powers under Section 151 CPC relate to procedure and cannot create substantive rights or override statutes.

It further applied the doctrine from *Union of India v. VKC Footsteps (India) (P) Ltd.*, establishing that refund of a statutory levy is purely a matter of statutory prescription and not a constitutional or inherent right.

Section 19(3B) of the RDB Act and Rule 4 of the 2013 Refund Rules were held to be specific only to recovery applications under the RDB Act.

The Division Bench first held the appeal maintainable, noting that the writ petition sought a prerogative writ of certiorari and directions against the Registrar, identifying it as an exercise of original jurisdiction under Article 226.

On the merits, the Court reasoned that court fees, once paid in accordance with law, belong to the State; thus, unless the assessment was erroneous or a statutory provision allowed for it, the Tribunal could not "dispense with the law" to grant a refund.

The Court distinguished *M.C. Subramanian*, noting that while purposive interpretation applies where a refund statute exists, it cannot be used to invent a refund power where the SARFAESI Act is silent.

The Bench clarified that the 2013 Refund Rules are strictly confined to RDB Act applications and cannot be extended to SARFAESI proceedings, especially given the overriding effect of Section 35 of the SARFAESI Act.

Finally, the Court rejected the *quid pro quo* argument, holding that a fee does not require a direct, measurable service to the specific payer to be valid.

(2) neither the Court nor the Tribunal has the inherent power to refund legally collected fees without statutory authorization;

and (3) the RDB Refund Rules do not apply to the SARFAESI Act.

The Writ Appeal was allowed, the Single Judge's order was set aside, and the prayer for refund of the court fee was denied.