True Owner is a Necessary Party in Suit for Declaration of Title by Adverse Possession

The plaintiff/appellant filed a suit for declaration of title by adverse possession and permanent injunction, claiming she had been in possession of the suit property for twenty-four years.

She asserted she constructed a brick-built structure and resided there without interference.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit on two grounds: non-joinder of the true owners as necessary parties and failure to establish the claim through cogent evidence.

The appellant challenged this dismissal, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur to argue that adverse possession can be used as a "sword" to maintain a suit for title.

1. Whether a suit for declaration of title by adverse possession is maintainable without impleading the true owners of the property?

2. Whether the appellant successfully proved the essential ingredients of adverse possession, specifically the starting point of possession and hostility toward the true owner?

The Court applied Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which prescribes a twelve-year period for the extinguishment of the owner's rights and the perfection of title by adverse possession.

It clarified the principles from Ravinder Kaur Grewal v. Manjit Kaur (2019) 8 SCC 729, noting that while adverse possession can be used as a "sword" to sue for title, such a claim requires proving nec vi, nec clam, nec precario.

The Court reiterated that to succeed, a claimant must acknowledge the true owner's title while maintaining open, continuous, and hostile possession in negation of that owner's rights.

The Court distinguished between protecting possession against third parties and seeking a formal declaration of title. It reasoned that since a declaration of title by adverse possession implicitly requires a finding that the true owner's title has been extinguished, the true owner is a "necessary party" to the suit.

The Court found the appellant’s pleadings fatally flawed because she failed to identify the true owners or state exactly when and how her possession became hostile.

It determined that "hostility" must be directed specifically at the true owner, and "mere proof of possession" cannot be equated with adverse possession.

Without a specific starting point/date for the adverse entry, the statutory period of twelve years cannot be calculated.

Failure to plead the identity of the true owner and the specific commencement point of hostile possession renders the suit unmaintainable.

The High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Trial Court's judgment dated July 10, 2025.

The suit was dismissed on contest and a formal decree was ordered.