UAPA accused not entitled to default bail after 90 days; 180-day investigation extension continues under BNSS, Delhi HC holds

An explosion occurred at Gate No. 4, Lal Qila Metro Station, Delhi, on 10 November 2025.

The case was registered by the NIA under provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (“UAPA”), and the Explosive Substances Act, 1908.

The Appellant was arrested on 17 November 2025 and initially granted 24 days of police custody, followed by judicial custody.

On 13 February 2026, the Trial Court, acting under Section 43D(2) of the UAPA read with Section 187 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (“BNSS”), extended the detention period by 45 days, up to 135 days from arrest.

The Appellant applied for default bail on 15 February 2026.

A further extension up to 180 days was granted on 27 March 2026, and the default-bail application was dismissed on 30 March 2026.

The NIA filed the charge-sheet on 14 May 2026, during the pendency of the appeal.

Whether the reference to Section 167 of the repealed Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“Cr.P.C.”) in Section 43D(2) of the UAPA must be construed as a reference to the corresponding Section 187 of the BNSS by virtue of Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897?

Whether, after the enactment of the BNSS, an accused prosecuted under the UAPA becomes entitled to default bail upon expiry of 90 days, or whether the detention period may still be extended up to 180 days under the first proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) of the UAPA?

Whether the Appellant could belatedly challenge the orders extending the investigation and detention period after failing to contest them promptly and after filing of the charge-sheet?

Whether the Public Prosecutor’s report seeking extension of the investigation period was required to be supplied to the accused?

The Court applied Section 43D(2) of the UAPA, which modifies the ordinary remand periods under Section 167 of the Cr.P.C. and permits extension of detention from 90 days up to 180 days where the Public Prosecutor’s report discloses the progress of investigation and specific reasons for continued detention.

Section 187(2)–(3) of the BNSS was treated as the corresponding re-enacted provision to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C., with the BNSS’s principal procedural change concerning the manner in which 15 days of police custody may be availed.

Under Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a reference to a repealed provision is ordinarily construed as a reference to the corresponding re-enacted provision, unless a contrary legislative intention appears.

The Court distinguished “legislation by reference” from “legislation by incorporation,” relying principally on Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Union of India, (1979) 2 SCC 529, and held that Section 43D(2) merely refers to, rather than bodily incorporates, Section 167 of the Cr.P.C.

It also relied on Syed Shahid Yousuf v. National Investigation Agency, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9329, regarding the requirements for extension under Section 43D(2), and Javed Siddiqui v. State of Uttarakhand, SLP (Crl.) No. 908/2026, for the principle that failure to promptly challenge extension orders may amount to acquiescence.

Following Zeeshan Qamar v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 1 HCC (Del) 720, the Court held that the Public Prosecutor’s report need not be furnished to the accused at the extension stage, although the accused must receive notice and an opportunity to make submissions.

The Court held that Section 43D(2) of the UAPA did not bodily incorporate the text of Section 167 of the Cr.P.C.; it only referred to that procedural provision and modified certain periods for UAPA prosecutions.

Consequently, Section 8(1) of the General Clauses Act operated to substitute the corresponding Section 187 of the BNSS for the reference to Section 167 of the Cr.P.C.

The changes introduced by Section 187 of the BNSS—particularly permitting 15 days of police custody in parts during the initial period—did not disclose any intention to remove the UAPA’s special extension mechanism.

Since Section 43D(2) expressly preserves the power to extend detention beyond 90 days up to 180 days, and the UAPA is a special enactment dealing with terrorism-related offences, the Court held that the BNSS did not impliedly restrict the UAPA period to 90 days.

The Appellant had also participated in the proceedings on the first extension application but did not challenge the order dated 13 February 2026 promptly.

Applying the principle of acquiescence, the Court held that he could not later challenge that order as a basis for claiming default bail, particularly after the subsequent extension and filing of the charge-sheet.

As to the Public Prosecutor’s report, the Court held that notice of the extension application and an opportunity of hearing were sufficient; disclosure of the report itself was not mandatory at that stage, provided the Special Court considered the accused’s submissions.

The first proviso to Section 43D(2)(b) therefore continued to permit extension of the investigation and detention period up to 180 days in UAPA cases; the Appellant was not entitled to default bail merely upon expiry of 90 days.

The Court further held that the delayed challenge to the first extension order was barred by acquiescence and that the Public Prosecutor’s report was not required to be supplied to the accused.

The appeal challenging the extension orders and rejection of default bail was dismissed, with pending applications also disposed of; the Appellant was left free to pursue any other remedy available in law.