Unauthorized transfer of licensed government premises creates no vested legal rights or entitlement to rehabilitation.

The petitioners challenged an order dated 26.11.2025 passed by the Lieutenant Governor of Delhi, which upheld eviction orders dated 17.05.2024 and 04.11.2024 issued under Sections 41 and 42 of the DUSIB Act, 2010

The petitioners’ father had purportedly purchased the subject property in 1989 from the original allottee, Bihari Lal.

Records indicated that the property was allotted to the original allottee on a license basis in 1965 for residential purposes only, with a strict prohibition against third-party transfers.

The respondent (DUSIB) initiated eviction on the grounds that the property was illegally transferred and was being used for commercial purposes in violation of the license terms.

1. Whether a license-basis allotment creates a transferable legal right in favor of a third-party purchaser without the consent of the issuing authority.

2. Whether the petitioners are entitled to rehabilitation or alternative accommodation under DUSIB policies when their claim is based on a purported sale of licensed government land.

The court primarily applied Sections 41 and 42 of the Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (DUSIB) Act, 2010, which empower the authority to evict unauthorized occupants from government property.

It further relied on the legal principle that a license does not create a vested interest or legal right in favor of the licensee to transfer premises to a third party, and any such transfer in violation of license terms is void and creates no indefeasible right in the transferee.

Additionally, the court noted that rehabilitation is governed strictly by the DUSIB Rehabilitation Policy.

The court observed that the original 1965 allotment was explicitly on a license basis, a fact undisputed by the petitioners.

The court reasoned that since the license terms prohibited transfer, the purported sale to the petitioners' father was illegal and could not create any vested legal right or title.

Consequently, the petitioners were deemed unauthorized occupants of government property.

Regarding the prayer for rehabilitation, the court noted that such relief is governed by specific policies usually reserved for jhuggi dwellers or encroachers.

Since the petitioners asserted their rights based on a "purported sale document" rather than as eligible encroachers under the policy, the court held that no direction for alternative accommodation could be issued.

The court dismissed the writ petition, denying the reliefs of certiorari and status quo, and further declined to issue directions for rehabilitation.