Under Rule 15(2), disciplinary authorities cannot overturn exoneration without sufficient evidence on record.

The petitioner, a Forest Guard posted at Bori Beat, Asir Range, Burhanpur Forest Division from 23 September 1994 to 30 December 2002, was suspended and charge-sheeted on two counts: failure to prevent or report an alleged 1,047-hectare encroachment in forest compartments 138–140, and failure to detect, seize, or report the illegal storage of 50 kg of Salai gum at Bori village.

After a departmental enquiry, the Enquiry Officer found both charges unproved.

The Disciplinary Authority disagreed, issued a show-cause notice proposing removal, and thereafter imposed the penalty of removal from service on 10 April 2006, despite the petitioner’s representation relying on more than 40 Preliminary Offence Reports (PORs), panchnamas, and police complaints.

On appeal, the Chief Conservator of Forests modified the penalty to reduction to the minimum of the pay scale for five years, considering the petitioner’s 23 years of service, “Very Good” ACRs, and commendation.

The petitioner challenged both orders under Article 226 of the Constitution, alleging perversity, non-application of mind, and findings based on no evidence.

1. Whether the Disciplinary Authority’s disagreement with the Enquiry Officer and finding of guilt on the encroachment charge were perverse and based on no evidence, particularly when the petitioner’s PORs, panchnamas, and reports to superior officers were allegedly ignored?

2. Whether the finding that the petitioner was responsible for, or had knowledge of, the illegal storage of Salai gum was based merely on suspicion and unsupported by evidence?

3. Whether the Disciplinary Authority complied with Rule 15(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, which requires reasons for disagreement and sufficient evidence on record before recording an independent finding of guilt?

4. Whether the punishment orders could be sustained when the underlying findings of guilt were perverse and legally unsustainable?

The Court applied the principle that judicial review under Article 226 is supervisory and not appellate; ordinarily, the Court will not re-appreciate evidence or substitute its own factual conclusions, but may intervene where findings are based on no evidence, ignore material evidence, rely on irrelevant considerations, or are so perverse that no reasonable person could have reached them.

In Union of India v. H.C. Goel, AIR 1964 SC 364, the Supreme Court held that interference is justified where a finding of guilt is based on no evidence.

B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749, establishes that judicial review concerns the decision-making process and permits interference where findings are based on no evidence or are perverse, while adequacy or reliability of evidence is ordinarily not re-examined.

United Bank of India v. Biswanath Bhattacharjee, (2022) 13 SCC 329, confirms that limited scrutiny of the disciplinary record is permissible to determine whether relevant material was ignored or findings were unsupported by evidence.

Under Rule 15(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966, a Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the Enquiry Officer must record reasons for disagreement and may record its own finding only where the evidence on record is sufficient for that purpose.

The Court also applied the principle lex non cogit ad impossibilia, meaning that the law does not compel a person to perform an impossibility, in assessing the petitioner’s ability to physically prevent an organized encroachment by a large mob.

The Court found that the Disciplinary Authority’s conclusion on the encroachment charge was contradicted by the record.

The petitioner had produced more than 40 PORs dating from 1996 onwards, along with panchnamas and police complaints showing that he had documented the encroachment, reported it to the Range Officer and the police, and confronted circumstances involving mobs of approximately 50 to 150 persons armed with agricultural implements.

Since a lone Forest Guard could not reasonably be expected to physically resist such an organized mob, the petitioner’s duty was substantially discharged by reporting and registering offences.

The Authority’s assertion that the petitioner had taken no action resulted from ignoring material departmental records and was therefore perverse.

Regarding the Salai gum, the Enquiry Officer had found no evidence connecting the petitioner with the storage or establishing his knowledge of it.

The Disciplinary Authority relied only on the circumstance that the gum was found outside the collection season and inferred that the petitioner must have known of it.

The Court held that such suspicion could not substitute for evidence of knowledge, complicity, or dereliction.

Consequently, the disagreement under Rule 15(2) was not supported by sufficient evidence and amounted to non-application of mind to material evidence.

The Appellate Authority’s reduction of the penalty on sympathetic grounds did not cure the fundamental defect in the findings of guilt.

The punishment order dated 10 April 2006 and the appellate order dated 21 September 2006 were quashed and set aside.

The respondents were directed to restore the petitioner’s pay scale as it stood before the penalty and grant all consequential benefits, including arrears of salary, applicable pay increases, and increments.

The arrears were directed to be calculated and released within 90 days of receipt of a certified copy of the order.

The writ petition was allowed, with no order as to costs.