Unexplained administrative delay and governmental file movement do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation.

The State of Gujarat and the Range Forest Officer, Dantiwada, filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, seeking condonation of 1093 days’ delay in filing a Second Appeal against the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court dated 19 April 2023.

The Second Appeal was filed on 15 July 2026.

The applicants attributed the delay to administrative exigencies, movement of the file between government offices, and the need to obtain approvals from higher authorities.

A recommendation to file an appeal was made by the Deputy Conservator of Forests on 21 August 2023, but the Chief Conservator of Forests returned the recommendation for correction only on 12 February 2025.

The applicants did not explain the intervening period of approximately one and a half years.

The Court allowed the draft amendment tendered by the learned Assistant Government Pleader.

1. Whether the applicants established “sufficient cause” under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, for condoning the 1093-day delay in filing the Second Appeal?

2. Whether administrative procedures, inter-departmental movement of files, and the requirement of approval from higher authorities justified condonation of such an inordinate delay, including by imposing costs or other conditions?

The Court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned only upon establishment of “sufficient cause.”

It relied on K.B. Lal (Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., 2024 (4) Scale 759, holding that discretionary condonation requires a reasonable, satisfactory and bona fide explanation and is unavailable where there is gross negligence, inaction or want of due diligence.

The Court also relied on Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs v. Special Deputy Collector (LA), 2024 INSC 286, which held that although Section 5 is to be construed liberally, discretion may still be refused in cases of inordinate delay, negligence or lack of diligence; merits ordinarily should not be examined at the condonation stage.

Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81, establishes that administrative difficulty or inactivity does not constitute sufficient cause where the party acted negligently or without bona fides, and delay cannot be condoned merely by imposing conditions.

The Court further relied on Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104, emphasizing that the length of delay, bona fides and the adequacy of the explanation must be examined before considering merits.

The Court found that the applicants’ explanation showed a grossly negligent and lackadaisical approach rather than a bona fide administrative delay.

In particular, no explanation was provided for the period between 21 August 2023, when the appeal was recommended, and 12 February 2025, when the recommendation was returned for correction.

The Chief Conservator’s failure to act for approximately one and a half years was held to be unjustified.

The remaining administrative steps also consumed excessive time that could have been avoided had the applicants acted diligently.

Applying the cited precedents, the Court held that government status does not exempt the applicants from the limitation law or justify unequal treatment under Article 14 of the Constitution.

Since the delay was inordinate and inadequately explained, the Court held that it could not be condoned even upon imposing costs or other conditions; the merits of the proposed Second Appeal were not considered.

The Civil Application for condonation of delay was accordingly rejected, with no order as to costs.

The Registry was directed to refuse registration of the Second Appeal and the Civil Application for stay, if any.