Unexplained delay in commercial appeals cannot be condoned merely for governmental approval formalities.

The Delhi Urban Shelter Improvement Board (“appellant”) filed a statutory commercial appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLI CPC against the impugned decree, with a delay of 439 days, seeking condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The appellant sought exclusion of time spent pursuing a review petition, obtaining certified copies, prosecuting an earlier appeal, and pursuing an application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC.

For the remaining delay, the appellant attributed the delay to departmental approval and codal formalities, including the suspension of an official and the resultant vacancy of the concerned post.

The Court held that, even after excluding the periods claimed by the appellant, a delay of 258 days remained unexplained.

The Court applied Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, read with Order XLI CPC, governing the statutory appeal, and Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, under which delay may be condoned only upon sufficient cause.

It considered the limitation framework under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act and the principles in Government of Maharashtra v. Borse Brothers Engineers & Contractors Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 6 SCC 460, that delay beyond the prescribed period in commercial appeals is to be condoned by way of exception and not as a rule, particularly where the party has acted negligently or without bona fides.

The Court also relied on Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 910, reiterating that the expression “sufficient cause” is not an elastic panacea for negligent or stale claims, that the object of the Commercial Courts Act is speedy resolution, and that Government entities are not entitled to a more lenient standard for condonation.

The appellant’s reliance on exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act was considered, but even the claimed exclusions did not eliminate the substantial remaining delay.

The Court accepted, for purposes of consideration, the periods claimed by the appellant for review proceedings, certified-copy procurement, the earlier appeal, and the Order IX Rule 13 proceedings; nevertheless, a delay of 258 days remained.

The explanation that the file was pending for “approval and codal formalities” did not identify the period of movement between offices, the duration for which the file was retained, the identity or period of absence of the suspended official, or why processing could not continue during the vacancy.

The Court therefore found the explanation vague and insufficient, reflecting negligence rather than bona fide diligence.

Applying the stricter approach mandated for commercial appeals under Borse Brothers and Jharkhand Urja, the Court concluded that the substantial unexplained delay could not be condoned merely because the appellant was a government instrumentality.

Consequently, RFA(COMM) 573/2026 was dismissed on the ground of limitation without examination of the merits.

The legal question raised in the appeal was expressly left open.