Unexplained delay in invoking Article 226 warrants dismissal, notwithstanding pending contempt proceedings.

The Union of India challenged the Central Administrative Tribunal’s order dated 14 September 2023 in O.A. No. 1562/2020.

The writ petition was filed approximately three years after the Tribunal’s order, without explaining the delay.

The respondents initiated contempt proceedings in 2025 alleging non-compliance with the Tribunal’s order, after which the petitioners approached the High Court; even thereafter, nearly one year elapsed before the writ petition was instituted.

The petitioners relied on departmental communications with the Department of Personnel and Training concerning the revival of posts and related administrative advice, as well as the institution of contempt proceedings, to explain the delay.

The High Court found that these events did not adequately explain the delayed filing of the writ petition.

1. Whether the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution was liable to be dismissed on the ground of unexplained delay and laches.

2. Whether the petitioners’ reliance on post-order departmental correspondence and the subsequent contempt proceedings constituted a sufficient explanation for the delay.

3. Whether the Court could grant liberty to the petitioners to approach the Tribunal by way of a review petition despite the unexplained delay in invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.

The Court applied the discretionary and extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, under which delay and laches are material considerations and a party that sleeps over its rights may be denied relief.

Relying on Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215, the Court reiterated that delay defeats equity; the High Court may refuse to exercise its writ jurisdiction where the applicant has failed to assert its rights for a considerable period and seeks to revive a stale cause of action.

The Court further held that Article 226 is not intended to serve as a “sanctuary against contempt,” meaning that the initiation of contempt proceedings cannot, by itself, justify a belated challenge to the underlying order.

The Tribunal’s order was passed on 14 September 2023, but the petitioners did not approach the High Court until 2026 and provided no satisfactory explanation for this delay.

The departmental correspondence referred to by the petitioners occurred in or around February 2024 and therefore did not explain why the writ petition was filed approximately two and a half years later.

The Court further considered the contempt proceedings to be the apparent trigger for the writ petition, rather than a genuine explanation for the earlier inaction.

Applying the principle that unexplained delay disentitles a litigant from discretionary relief under Article 226, the Court declined to examine the merits.

Since the petitioners refused the Court’s suggestion to withdraw and refile the petition with a proper explanation, the Court also declined to grant liberty to pursue review proceedings before the Tribunal.

It also refused to grant liberty to the petitioners to approach the Tribunal by way of review, as doing so would effectively require the Court to assume jurisdiction despite the unexplained delay.