### Unilateral cancellation of a registered ninety-nine-year lease deed lacking a revocation clause is legally impermissible.

Late Anima Bose (Defendant No. 1) owned the "Plaint Schedule Property" and executed a registered 99-year "lease deed" (Ext. 1) in favor of the Appellant/Vivekananda Kendra on 23.03.1998 for spiritual and service activities at an annual rent of ₹1,000.

On 03.12.2003, Bose unilaterally cancelled the lease and subsequently sold the property to Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 (Defendant Nos. 3 and 4) via a sale deed dated 17.01.2006 during the pendency of the suit.

The Appellant filed a suit for declaration of leasehold rights and recovery of possession, alleging forcible dispossession.

The Trial Court and First Appellate Court decreed the suit in favor of the Appellant, holding the unilateral cancellation illegal.

However, the High Court of Orissa set aside these findings, characterizing Ext. 1 as a "licence" rather than a "lease," thereby dismissing the suit.

Whether the document dated 23.03.1998 (Ext. 1) constitutes a lease or a licence.

Whether, during the subsistence of the leasehold right, a sale in favor of third parties including possessory rights could be legally effected.

The Court primarily applied Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, defining a lease as a transfer of a right to enjoy property for consideration.

It relied on Section 52 of the Indian Easements Act, defining a licence as a mere permission to use property without transferring an interest.

It relied on the landmark principles in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor, which established that the substance and intention of the parties—specifically whether an interest in the property is created—distinguish a lease from a licence.

The Court also applied the rules of construction from Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmi Narayan Satose, emphasizing the "literal rule" where the plain, ordinary meaning of the text is prioritized unless it leads to absurdity.

The Supreme Court observed that the High Court erred by relying on ex-post facto conduct and circumstances instead of the literal text of the deed.

Upon a plain reading of Ext. 1, the Court found conclusive indicators of a lease: the use of the term "demises," the grant of a 99-year term, the reservation of yearly rent, and the lessee’s right to make structural alterations.

The Court clarified that the lessor's retention of the first floor did not negate the lease, as exclusive possession is assessed against the specific demised portion, not the entire building.

Because the deed contained no clause for unilateral revocation and lacked triggers under Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act, the Court determined the unilateral cancellation was non-est.

The Court held that when the text and context are clear, courts must not stretch interpretation beyond the original scope of the covenants.

It held that Ext. 1 is a valid 99-year lease and the unilateral cancellation was illegal.

The Court restored the decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court, confirming the Appellant's leasehold rights and entitlement to recovery of possession.

The rights of the subsequent purchasers (Respondents 1 and 2) are subject to the Appellant's protected leasehold interest for the remainder of the term.