Unnatural conduct of an eyewitness and unexplained delay in naming the accused warrants acquittal.

The deceased, Basta Murmu, was a servant in the house of the informant, Marangmai Hansda.

On the night of 13.04.1997, the deceased was assaulted while sleeping in the veranda, resulting in fatal head injuries caused by a hard and blunt substance.

The informant initially filed a fardbeyan against unknown persons, stating no male members were present in the house.

Later, a second fardbeyan was recorded, and the prosecution introduced P.W.2 (Dez Marandi) as an eye-witness who claimed to be sleeping next to the deceased.

The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC on 03.07.1998, sentencing him to rigorous imprisonment for life.

The appellant challenged this on grounds of material contradictions, unnatural conduct of the eye-witness, and medical divergence.

Whether the material adduced at trial is sufficient to attract the offence of murder under Section 302 of the IPC.

Whether the uncorroborated testimony of a single eye-witness (P.W.2) is sufficient to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether the appellant is entitled to the "benefit of doubt" due to inter-se and intra-se contradictions in witness testimonies and medical evidence.

The Court applied Section 302 of the IPC concerning punishment for murder.

It relied on the "sterling witness" doctrine from Rai Sandeep @ Deepu v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2012), requiring an eye-witness's version to be of very high quality and unassailable.

Regarding contradictions between ocular and medical evidence, it followed Bhajan Singh v. State of Haryana (2011), holding that while ocular evidence generally prevails, it may be disbelieved if medical evidence completely rules out its possibility.

The Court further applied the principle from State of Orissa v. Mr. Brahmananda Nanda (1976) regarding the effect of unexplained delay in disclosing the assailant's name.

The "golden thread" of criminal jurisprudence from Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra (1984), necessitating that if two views are possible, the one favorable to the accused must be adopted.

The Court observed that the prosecution’s case rested almost entirely on P.W.2, whose conduct was deemed highly unnatural.

Despite claiming to be an eye-witness, P.W.2 failed to disclose the appellant's name to the informant immediately or to the police for three days, providing an unconvincing explanation of being threatened.

Furthermore, P.W.2’s testimony was inconsistent; he alleged the use of a sharp-cutting weapon (Kulhari), whereas the medical evidence (P.W.12 & P.W.14) exclusively found injuries caused by a hard and blunt substance (lathi), ruling out sharp-edged weapons.

The informant (P.W.9) also improved her version, initially claiming no male members were present, but later asserting P.W.11 was sleeping there—a claim P.W.11 himself refuted.

The Court found these "vital contradictions" and the lack of a "sterling" quality in P.W.2’s testimony created a significant gap between "may be true" and "must be true".

The Court held that the un-natural conduct of the sole eye-witness and the irreconcilable conflict between the ocular and medical evidence entitled the appellant to the benefit of doubt.

The Judgment of conviction dated 03.07.1998 and the Order of sentence dated 04.07.1998 were quashed and set aside.

The appellant was discharged from all criminal liabilities and his bail bonds were cancelled.