Unpleaded fragmentation-law violations involving factual inquiry do not raise substantial questions of law.

The respondent-plaintiff purchased the suit property from his uncle, Galabhai Kalubhai Meda, through a registered sale deed dated 19 June 2019 and claimed ownership and possession over it.

Alleging interference by the defendants, he instituted Regular Civil Suit No. 7 of 2019 seeking declaration of title and permanent injunction.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 18 December 2023.

On appeal, the Principal District Judge, Mahisagar, re-appreciated the evidence, declared the plaintiff owner of the suit property, and granted a permanent injunction by judgment dated 10 June 2026.

The original defendants challenged that decision in the present second appeal under Section 100 CPC, contending that the sale was invalid for want of co-owner consent and was void under Section 9 of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 (“Fragmentation Act”).

1. Whether the plaintiff’s purchase of the suit property through a registered sale deed was invalid because the consent of the other co-owners had not been obtained?

2. Whether the sale deed was void as being in violation of Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act, and whether the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute?

3. Whether the second appeal involved any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC?

The Court applied Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, under which a second appeal lies only where a substantial question of law arises.

It relied on Sections 54 and 44 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882: Section 54 recognises transfer of title through a sale, while Section 44 permits a co-owner to transfer his share in immovable property without obtaining the prior consent of the other co-owners.

The Court considered Section 9 of the Gujarat Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947, but held that the alleged violation involved a mixed question of fact and law requiring pleadings and factual inquiry.

It also relied on the newly inserted Section 9(4), introduced by the Gujarat Ordinance dated 14 July 2026, which deemed transfers or partitions made between 29 January 1948 and 31 March 2026, contrary to the Act, to have been regularised without penalty or premium.

The Court further followed Russi Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Bhavna Seth, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 555, and Jaichand (Dead) through LRs v. Sahnulal, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3864, reaffirming that factual findings of the First Appellate Court cannot ordinarily be disturbed in second appeal absent perversity, inadmissible evidence, absence of evidence, or violation of mandatory law.

The Court found that the plaintiff had acquired the suit property through a registered sale deed and had been placed in possession by the original owner, satisfying the requirements of a sale under Section 54 of the Transfer of Property Act.

The objection that consent of the other co-owners was necessary was rejected because Section 44 permits a co-owner to transfer his share without prior consent from the remaining co-owners.

The defendants’ reliance on Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act was also rejected because the issue had not been pleaded or raised before the Trial Court, and no complaint had been made before the competent revenue authority.

The Court held that the alleged statutory violation was not a pure question of law and could not be raised for the first time in second appeal.

In any event, the subsequent insertion of Section 9(4) regularised the relevant transfers made within the specified period, thereby substantially removing the defendants’ objection.

Since the First Appellate Court’s findings were based on appreciation of the evidence and no perversity or legal error was demonstrated, no substantial question of law arose under Section 100 CPC.

The defendants’ objection under Section 9 of the Fragmentation Act was neither properly pleaded nor supported by a factual inquiry, and was in any event affected by the statutory regularisation introduced through Section 9(4).

Finding no substantial question of law, the Court dismissed the second appeal in limine, confirmed the First Appellate Court’s judgment and decree declaring the plaintiff owner and granting permanent injunction, imposed no order as to costs, and disposed of the connected Civil Application for stay.