Unproved Ikrarnama and FSL reports cannot establish relinquishment of partnership or tenancy rights.

The suit property comprised Shop Nos. 7 and 8, Esplanade Road, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, which was originally tenanted by Devi Singh, father of Sewa Ram. After Devi Singh’s death in 1986, the tenancy devolved upon Sewa Ram.

On 3 August 1989, Sewa Ram and the defendants executed a partnership deed to conduct the business of “Mona Studio” from the suit property. Sewa Ram held a 50% share and was the sleeping partner, while the defendants held 25% each and managed the business and accounts. The partnership was fixed for ten years, ending on 2 August 1999.

By notice dated 20 June 1999, Sewa Ram expressed his intention not to continue the partnership, sought settlement of accounts, and demanded possession of the suit property.

After earlier proceedings and withdrawal with liberty to file afresh, Sewa Ram instituted the present suit for dissolution of partnership, rendition of accounts, and mandatory injunction for recovery of possession.

The defendants relied on an alleged Ikrarnama/Memorandum of Understanding dated 29 April 1995, under which Sewa Ram allegedly acknowledged loans amounting to ₹10,15,940 and agreed that, upon non-payment by 1 January 1999, he would cease to be a partner and surrender his tenancy rights to the defendants.

The Trial Court rejected this defence, passed a preliminary decree for rendition of accounts, and directed delivery of possession of the suit property to Sewa Ram’s legal representatives.

Rajinder Kumar preferred the present appeal under Section 96 CPC.

Whether the alleged Ikrarnama/MoU dated 29 April 1995, recording the alleged loan transactions and relinquishment of Sewa Ram’s partnership and tenancy rights, was duly proved and could defeat Sewa Ram’s claim?

Whether the alleged loan transactions and the appellant’s reliance on the Ikrarnama/MoU were established by the evidence on record?

Whether the FSL reports relied upon by the defendants were admissible and sufficient to establish the genuineness of Sewa Ram’s signatures on the Ikrarnama/MoU?

Whether the tenancy in the suit property had been lawfully transferred in favour of defendant no. 1 with effect from 1 January 1999?

Whether the partnership had come to an end by efflux of time and whether Sewa Ram’s legal representatives were entitled to rendition of accounts and possession?

The Court exercised appellate jurisdiction under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

It applied the principle that mere marking of a document as an exhibit does not prove its execution or contents, as held in Sait Tarajee Khimchand & Ors. v. Yelamarti Satyam & Ors., (1972) 4 SCC 562.

It further applied the rule that an expert’s report does not become evidence automatically; the expert must ordinarily be examined and subjected to cross-examination, as held in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Jai Lal & Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 280, and reiterated in Novartis AG v. Natco Pharma Ltd., 2021 SCC OnLine Del 4849.

Expert opinion is advisory and cannot replace substantive evidence; corroboration is required, consistent with S. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1996) 4 SCC 596, and Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy, (2019) 14 SCC 220.

The Court also applied the contractual terms of the partnership deed, under which the partnership was for a fixed period of ten years and possession was to revert to Sewa Ram after dissolution and settlement of accounts.

A party claiming transfer of tenancy was required to establish such transfer through reliable evidence.

The Court held that the partnership deed itself fixed the partnership term from 3 August 1989 to 2 August 1999 and provided for restoration of possession to Sewa Ram after dissolution and settlement of accounts.

Sewa Ram had also issued a notice terminating the arrangement and demanding accounts and possession, and the appellant admitted receipt of the notice but did not reply to it.

The appellant’s defence depended substantially on the alleged Ikrarnama/MoU and the underlying loan transactions. However, he admitted that no contemporaneous loan documents or receipts had been executed, that the alleged loans were not reflected in income-tax returns, and that no demand for repayment had been made.

The Court therefore found the alleged loan arrangement insufficiently established.

The FSL reports were not proved through examination of the concerned expert and, in any event, constituted only opinion evidence rather than conclusive proof of execution.

The Ikrarnama/MoU named two attesting witnesses, but neither was examined. Further, defendant no. 1 could not recall the witnesses’ names or provide reliable details regarding attestation, registration, or purchase of the stamp paper.

Applying the rule in Sait Tarajee Khimchand, the Court held that mere exhibition of the document did not cure the failure to prove it.

The plea of transfer of tenancy also failed. Although rent receipts were produced, the landlord was not examined to prove them, and the alleged letter by Sewa Ram requesting transfer of tenancy could not be produced even in copy.

Conversely, the testimony of Sewa Ram’s legal representative that the tenancy continued under subsequent landlords remained unrebutted because the defendants did not cross-examine him on that aspect.

Accordingly, the appellant failed to establish either a valid relinquishment of Sewa Ram’s rights or a lawful transfer of tenancy.

The Trial Court’s preliminary decree for rendition of partnership accounts and the direction for delivery of possession of the suit property to Sewa Ram’s legal representatives were upheld.

Pending applications were also disposed of.