Unsubstantiated allegations of conjugal refusal and harassment do not establish cruelty or desertion.

The parties married on 7 July 1992 and had three children.

The husband sought divorce under Sections 13(1)(ia) and 13(1)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, alleging cruelty, including refusal of conjugal relations, and desertion.

The wife denied the allegations and maintained that the husband had left the matrimonial home; she remained willing to continue the marriage.

The Family Court dismissed the petition, finding cruelty and desertion unproved.

The husband appealed.

1. Whether the wife’s alleged refusal to maintain conjugal relations, threats, complaints and other conduct established mental cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia).

2. Whether the wife had deserted the husband within the meaning of Section 13(1)(ib), including by withdrawing from matrimonial cohabitation while residing in the same home.

3. Whether the parties’ earlier mutual-consent divorce proceedings or the alleged irretrievable breakdown of the marriage justified granting divorce in this appeal.

Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act permits divorce where cruelty is established; mental cruelty must be assessed in the context of the parties’ entire matrimonial life, and ordinary disagreements or isolated incidents are insufficient.

Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511, provides illustrative, non-exhaustive indicators of mental cruelty, including a sustained and unjustified refusal of intercourse.

Section 13(1)(ib) requires desertion for at least two continuous years immediately before the petition; desertion requires both the factum of separation and the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.

Allegations of false criminal complaints must be supported by cogent material establishing their falsity or malicious purpose.

A mutual-consent decree under Section 13-B requires continuing mutual consent, and irretrievable breakdown alone is not a ground available to High Courts under Sections 13 or 13-B; the Supreme Court may grant relief on that basis in the exercise of Article 142 powers (Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain, (2009) 10 SCC 415).

The Court also applied Dr. Anita v. Indresh Gopal Kohli on the need for cogent evidence of wilful desertion or refusal to cohabit before concluding that a marriage has irretrievably broken down.

The wife denied refusing conjugal relations or threatening and harassing the husband, and the husband did not produce cogent evidence to substantiate those allegations.

The evidence did not establish a sustained, unilateral refusal of intercourse sufficient to constitute cruelty.

The parties’ adult children testified that their father frequently visited the home and that they shared meals; they denied that he had continuously lived separately since 2011.

The Court therefore found that the husband had chosen to reside separately and had not proved that the wife intended permanently to end cohabitation.

The wife’s withdrawal of consent to the earlier mutual-consent petition did not itself establish cruelty or desertion, and the High Court could not convert the appeal into a Section 13-B proceeding or grant divorce solely for irretrievable breakdown.

The appeal was dismissed, and the Family Court’s judgment and decree refusing divorce were affirmed.