Unsubstantiated claims of counsel’s non-communication fail to establish sufficient cause for condoning delay.

The appellant filed a Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenging the Award dated 09.11.2024 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Guna.

Accompanying the appeal was I.A. No. 7725 of 2025, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking to condone a delay of 240 days.

The appellant contended that as an illiterate villager, he remained unaware of the award because his trial counsel failed to inform him, gaining knowledge only upon receiving execution notices on 25.07.2025.

He further argued that the Insurance Company had initiated "pay and recover" proceedings against him, and since a cross-appeal for enhancement was pending, the delay should be condoned to prevent grave prejudice.

Whether the appellant established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of 240 days in filing the appeal.

The court primarily applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, regarding the condonation of delay upon showing sufficient cause.

It relied on the principle from Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013), which established that while a liberal approach is preferred, it must not allow a party to take the law for granted or reward a lack of bona fides.

the court cited Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012), holding that in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically.

The court observed that although the Motor Vehicles Act is social welfare legislation warranting a liberal approach, the law of limitation cannot be rendered redundant.

It found the appellant's explanation—ignorance due to non-communication by counsel—to be general in nature and entirely unsupported by evidence demonstrating due diligence.

The court noted that the appellant, being a party to the original proceedings, could not shift the entire burden of negligence onto his counsel without substantiating the plea.

Consequently, the court determined that the explanation provided did not convincingly cover the entire period of delay, failing the test of "sufficient cause" as the explanation was neither plausible nor bona fide.

Accordingly, I.A. No. 7725 of 2025 was dismissed. As a result of the dismissal of the condonation application, the Miscellaneous Appeal was dismissed as barred by limitation.