Unsubstantiated claims of non-communication by counsel do not constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay.

The appellant filed a Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 173(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, challenging the award dated 09.11.2024 passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal (MACT), Guna

Accompanying the appeal was an application (I.A. No. 8259 of 2025) under Section 5 of the Limitation Act seeking to condone a delay of 240 days

The appellant, an illiterate villager, contended that his trial counsel failed to inform him of the award and he only discovered the proceedings upon receiving execution notices on 25.07.2025

The appellant obtained a certified copy on 10.09.2025 and subsequently filed the appeal, arguing the delay was bona fide and caused by the "pay and recover" recovery proceedings initiated by the Insurance Company

Whether the appellant established "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to warrant the condonation of a 240-day delay in filing the appeal

The court primarily applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which requires the showing of "sufficient cause" for condoning delays

It relied on the precedent in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy (2013) 12 SCC 649, which established that a liberal approach should not enable a party to take the law for granted or mask a lack of bona fides

It applied the principle from Postmaster General v. Living Media India Ltd. (2012) 3 SCC 563, holding that in the absence of a plausible and acceptable explanation, delay cannot be condoned mechanically

The court reasoned that while the Motor Vehicles Act is beneficial legislation requiring a liberal approach, the law of limitation cannot be rendered otiose

The court found the appellant’s plea—shifting blame to the trial counsel for non-communication—to be a general statement unsupported by material evidence or proof of due diligence

The court noted that the appellant, being a party to the original proceedings, had a duty to remain diligent and could not shift the entire burden onto his counsel

The court further determined that the timeline provided regarding knowledge gained through execution proceedings did not satisfactorily explain the entire duration of the 240-day delay, concluding that the explanation lacked the necessary plausibility and bona fides

Consequently, the court dismissed I.A. No. 8259 of 2025 for condonation of delay and subsequently dismissed the Miscellaneous Appeal as barred by limitation