Unsubstantiated illness without contemporaneous medical evidence does not constitute sufficient cause for condoning delay.

The Appellant/Plaintiff instituted a suit for possession, arrears of rent, mesne profits/damages and permanent injunction concerning property bearing No. C-15/8, Kabir Nagar, Delhi, asserting that he had acquired the property through a General Power of Attorney and that the Respondent was his tenant at a monthly rent of ₹4,500.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit, holding that the landlord–tenant relationship, title, and valid termination of tenancy had not been proved.

The Plaintiff filed a first appeal along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, claiming that illness from 22 April 2017 to 23 March 2018 prevented timely filing.

The First Appellate Court rejected the condonation application and consequently dismissed the appeal as time-barred.

The Plaintiff thereafter preferred the present Regular Second Appeal under Section 100 CPC, challenging the refusal to condone the delay and raising objections concerning the Trial Court’s findings on tenancy, title and termination.

1. Whether the First Appellate Court correctly refused to condone the delay in filing the first appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on the ground that the Appellant had failed to establish sufficient cause

2. Whether the present Regular Second Appeal raised any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 CPC

Section 5 of the Limitation Act permits extension of limitation only where the applicant establishes “sufficient cause” for not filing the proceeding within the prescribed period.

Relying on State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3612, the Court held that the sufficient cause must ordinarily arise before expiry of limitation and must explain why the proceeding could not be instituted in time.

Under Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., 1961 SCC OnLine SC 39, proof of sufficient cause is a condition precedent to exercising discretion under Section 5; considerations of diligence and bona fides arise only after sufficient cause is shown.

The Court also relied on Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi, (2021) 18 SCC 384, which treated an unexplained period between alleged recovery and the filing of the appeal as evidencing negligence and want of due diligence.

A second appeal under Section 100 CPC lies only where a substantial question of law is involved; pure or disputed questions of fact do not ordinarily warrant such interference.

The Appellant relied on two medical certificates dated 23 March 2018 stating that he had been suffering from pulmonary tuberculosis and hepatitis and had been advised bed rest from 22 April 2017.

The Court held that the certificates were not supported by contemporaneous prescriptions, treatment records, hospitalisation documents or other medical material demonstrating continuous incapacity throughout the limitation period.

They established, at most, the Appellant’s condition on the date of issuance and did not explain why he was unable to contact counsel or file the appeal during the entire period of delay.

Further, no cogent explanation was offered for the period between the alleged recovery on 23 March 2018 and the actual filing of the appeal.

Consequently, the Appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving sufficient cause, and the First Appellate Court’s exercise of discretion was neither arbitrary nor perverse.

Since the first appeal had been dismissed as barred by limitation and the challenge essentially concerned factual findings and the refusal to condone delay, no substantial question of law arose under Section 100 CPC.

The dismissal of the first appeal as time-barred was affirmed, and the Regular Second Appeal was dismissed for raising no substantial question of law.

Pending applications, if any, were also disposed of.