Vague Allegation of Illness Without Supporting Evidence Does Not Constitute Good Cause Under Order IX Rule 7

The petitioners (defendants) are in a partition suit (Original Suit No. 12 of 2024) filed by the opposite party.

The petitioners appeared on 20.06.2024 but failed to file a written statement within the statutory 90-day period, leading the trial court to debar them from filing on 26.09.2024.

Subsequently, three plaintiff witnesses were examined and cross-examined by other defendants while the petitioners remained inactive.

On 13.08.2025, after a delay of over a year, Petitioner No. 1 filed an application under Order IX Rule 7 read with Section 151 of the CPC to set aside the debarment, citing vague "illness" without supporting documentation.

The Civil Judge (Senior Division)-I, Khunti, dismissed the application on 27.11.2025, finding no "good cause" for non-appearance.

The petitioners challenged this under Article 227 of the Constitution.

1. Whether the trial court committed a patent perversity or jurisdictional error in dismissing the application under Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC to set aside the order debarring the defendants from filing a written statement.

2. Whether the petitioners demonstrated "good cause" for their non-appearance and failure to file a written statement for a period exceeding one year.

The court applied Order IX Rule 7 of the CPC, which requires a party to show "good cause" for previous non-appearance to be heard in answer to the suit as if they had appeared on the day fixed.

It strictly followed the principles of superintendence under Article 227 of the Constitution as formulated in Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil (2010), holding that interference is warranted only to keep subordinate courts "within the bounds of their authority" or in cases of "patent perversity" and "gross failure of justice".

The court distinguished the precedent of SREI International Finance Limited v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd. (2005), noting that while a "liberal view" is taken when specific incapacitation (like a serious accident of counsel) is proven, it does not apply to vague, unsubstantiated claims.

The Court observed that the petitioners had knowledge of the proceedings and were represented by counsel who specifically stated he had "no instruction" during the examination of witnesses.

The court noted the petitioners' failure to produce any medical documents or even identify the specific nature of the illness that allegedly incapacitated Petitioner No. 1 for over a year.

Applying the Shalini Shyam Shetty standard, the Court reasoned that the trial court did not act mechanically but rather evaluated the lack of "good cause" and the petitioners’ lack of eagerness to participate.

The High Court found no manifest failure of justice or flouting of natural justice, as the petitioners were given "ample opportunity" which they neglected through a "vague plea".

The court affirmed that the discretionary power under Order IX Rule 7 CPC cannot be exercised in the absence of a demonstrable "good cause" and that the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is limited to correcting jurisdictional errors or patent perversities.

The interim stay granted on 12.02.2026 was vacated.