Vague allegations based on apprehension and suspicion cannot sustain criminal prosecution for conspiracy.

In brief

The question

1. Whether a criminal complaint based on "apprehension" and "suspicion" without specific overt acts constitutes a cognizable offence sufficient to sustain prosecution.

The court held

The Court answered the issues in the affirmative, holding that the complaint was a gross abuse of the process of law.

It also directed

The High Court allowed the writ petition and quashed the criminal complaint and the ACJM’s order dated 26.03.2016 specifically as they pertained to the then Chief Justice, the sitting Judge, and the judicial officers (Respondents 11–19 in the trial court).

The relief was restricted to these individuals, without expressing an opinion on the merits regarding other accused persons.

01Facts

The Petitioner (High Court Administration) sought to quash an unregistered criminal complaint filed on 26.03.2016 by Respondent No. 2 (wife of a judicial officer, Respondent No. 3) before the ACJM, Raipur.

¶ 3

The complaint alleged a conspiracy involving the then Chief Justice, a sitting High Court Judge, and senior judicial officers (Respondents 11–19 in the trial court) to prevent the police from filing a chargesheet in an FIR related to an incident at Arang Toll Plaza on 31.10.2015.

¶ 6-8

The complainant alleged that this conspiracy was linked to administrative actions against her husband, including transfers and termination from service.

¶ 22

The ACJM had entertained the complaint and fixed it for recording preliminary evidence.

¶ 5

02Issues

i.1. Whether a criminal complaint based on "apprehension" and "suspicion" without specific overt acts constitutes a cognizable offence sufficient to sustain prosecution.

¶ 29

ii.2. Whether the High Court can exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 to quash a criminal complaint at the stage of preliminary inquiry to prevent abuse of the process of law.

¶ 35, 37

03Law Applied

The Court applied Section 120-B of the IPC, noting that criminal conspiracy requires a specific agreement to do an illegal act.

¶ 30

It relied on the landmark precedent *State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992)*, which permits quashing where allegations are absurd, improbable, or maliciously instituted.

¶ 18, 32

It further applied *Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. (2015)* and *Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate (1998)*, establishing that summoning an accused is a serious matter and criminal law cannot be set in motion on surmises or conjectures.

¶ 17, 19, 33

Additionally, *Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra (2021)* was cited regarding the contours of judicial interference at the threshold stage.

¶ 34

Provisions in the judgment · 9 · Linked ones open on LawLens

Indian Penal Code, 1860 Section 294 Section 323 Section 506 Section 186 Section 353 Section 511 Section 34

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 Section 200 Section 482

04Reasoning

The Court observed that the complaint was built entirely upon the complainant's "apprehension" and lacked specific details regarding any meeting of minds, dates, or prohibited acts by the judicial officers.

¶ 29

It noted that the alleged Toll Plaza incident was already subject to a separate FIR and had no logical connection to the arrayed High Court Judges or officers.

¶ 31

The Court reasoned that administrative grievances—such as transfers or termination—belong to service jurisprudence and cannot be camouflaged as a criminal conspiracy without tangible evidence.

¶ 36

The Court found the allegations to be "manifestly absurd" and "inherently improbable," concluding that the complaint was an attempt to scandalize the judiciary and ventilate personal service-related grievances through the criminal justice system.

¶ 14, 16, 38