Vague and hypothetical explanations fail to constitute sufficient cause for condoning inordinate delay in filing review petitions.

The petitioner filed a review petition seeking to challenge the judgment dated 12.03.2024 passed in a Second Appeal.

However, the petition was filed with a delay of 589 days.

The petitioner filed I.A. No. 11579 of 2025 under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone this delay.

The petitioner, claiming to be a "rustic villager," argued that he was informed of the judgment late by his counsel and subsequently spent time filing a separate civil suit for declaration and injunction before seeking legal opinion to file the present review.

The respondents opposed the application, asserting the claim was barred by time.

1. Whether the petitioner demonstrated "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone a delay of 589 days in filing the review petition.

The court applied Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which requires the applicant to show "sufficient cause" for the delay.

It relied on the principles from *Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy*, which established that while a pragmatic approach is needed, "sufficient cause" cannot be stretched to protect a "sleeping litigant" or gross negligence.

It further cited *P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala*, asserting that the law of limitation must be applied with rigor regardless of equitable grounds.

*Pundlilk Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon*, which held that statutes of limitation are "statutes of peace" meant to prevent the disturbance of rights acquired through long enjoyment and to suppress fraud.

The court found that the petitioner’s explanation was a "classic case" of a litigant waking up from a "deep slumber".

It reasoned that the explanation provided in the "skeleton application" was hypothetical, vague, and lacked material particulars to constitute sufficient cause.

The court emphasized that while a "liberal approach" is often cited, it cannot be used to jettison the substantive law of limitation, especially when a party has been thoroughly negligent.

The court noted that the petitioner failed to provide a cogent or satisfactory reason for the 589-day gap, rendering the application "hopelessly time-barred".

Consequently, I.A. No. 11579/2025 was dismissed.

The Review Petition was dismissed as barred by limitation with no order as to costs.