Vague, omnibus domestic-violence allegations without specific roles warrant quashing proceedings against relatives.

The complainant married petitioner No.1 on 7 May 2001 and alleged that her husband and in-laws subjected her to physical and mental cruelty, drove her out of the matrimonial home, and failed to maintain her and their daughter.

She filed Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 904 of 2014 under Section 12 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”) before the JMFC, Mahesana, against her husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sisters-in-law.

The petitioners invoked Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), contending that the complaint was filed after an inordinate delay, contained vague and omnibus allegations, and that petitioner No.5 was residing separately at Vadodara.

During the proceedings, petitioner No.2 died on 18 October 2018, and the petition as against her abated.

1. Whether the proceedings under Section 12 of the DV Act were liable to be quashed under Section 482 CrPC against petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 on the ground that the allegations against them were vague and unsupported by the contemporaneous record.

2. Whether the delay in filing the application under Section 12 of the DV Act and the allegedly vague allegations justified quashing the proceedings against petitioner Nos. 1 and 5.

3. What was the effect of petitioner No.2’s death on the proceedings.

The Court applied Section 482 CrPC, which confers inherent power on the High Court to prevent abuse of process and secure the ends of justice, including quashing proceedings where the allegations do not disclose a sufficient case.

It considered Section 12 of the DV Act, under which an aggrieved woman may present an application seeking reliefs under the DV Act.

Relying on *Kamatchi v. Lakshmi Narayanan*, Neutral Citation 2022 INSC 422, the Court held that an application under Section 12 of the DV Act is not barred merely because it was filed after a substantial lapse of time; the factual allegations and the existence of domestic violence must ordinarily be examined by the Magistrate on the basis of the pleadings, response, inquiry and evidence.

Proceedings against a deceased accused do not continue and abate upon proof of death.

The Court distinguished between the allegations against petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 and those against petitioner Nos. 1 and 5.

Although the complaint contained general allegations against petitioner Nos. 3 and 4, the advocate’s notice issued in 2004—contemporaneous with the alleged matrimonial disputes—contained no allegations of domestic violence against them, whereas it specifically referred to the husband and sister-in-law.

This omission materially weakened the case against petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 and justified quashing the proceedings against them.

In contrast, the allegations against petitioner Nos. 1 and 5 required consideration of the Protection/Probation Officer’s report, the parties’ responses, evidence and other factual circumstances.

Applying *Kamatchi*, the Court held that the delay of approximately eleven years did not by itself warrant quashing, and that the disputed factual issues could not be conclusively determined under Section 482 CrPC at that stage.

The proceedings against petitioner No.2 had already abated due to her death.

Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 904 of 2014 under Section 12 of the DV Act was quashed and set aside only insofar as petitioner Nos. 3 and 4 were concerned.

The proceedings against petitioner Nos. 1 and 5 were permitted to continue before the Magistrate on their merits, uninfluenced by the observations concerning petitioner Nos. 3 and 4.

Rule was made absolute to that extent, and the interim relief earlier granted stood vacated against petitioner Nos. 1 and 5.