Vehicle involvement in motor claims may be established cumulatively on a preponderance of probabilities.

Satish Kumar Gupta was riding a scooter on 28 April 2011 when, according to the claimants, a Maruti SX4 driven by Yogendra Pal Singh struck him near Vivekanand Mahila College, Vivek Vihar. Gupta later died from his injuries.

The MACT dismissed the claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, finding the offending vehicle’s involvement unproved.

The claimants appealed, relying on eyewitness testimony, the charge-sheet, vehicle-damage evidence and the owner’s response to a notice under Section 133 of the Act.

The insurer disputed the vehicle’s involvement and asserted that the car had been in a different accident.

1. Whether the claimants established, on a preponderance of probabilities, that the insured car was involved in the accident and its driver was negligent, notwithstanding discrepancies in the initial reporting and the timing of the eyewitness statements.

2. Whether, upon finding liability established, the matter should be remanded to the MACT to determine the quantum of compensation.

A claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act is determined on the civil standard of preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt; claimants need not provide strict proof of the accident in every detail (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530; Geeta Dubey v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3779).

The court also referred to the prudent-person approach to probability: the evidence must make the asserted event more probable than not, without requiring certainty (M. Siddiq v. Suresh Das, (2020) 1 SCC 1).

An initially unidentified vehicle or delay in recording an eyewitness statement is not, by itself, fatal where the vehicle’s identity is later supported by cogent and reliable evidence (Kuncham Lavanya v. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Co. Ltd., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 749; Firoz Khan Akbarkhan v. State of Maharashtra, 2025 INSC 387; Goutam Joardar v. State of W.B., (2022) 17 SCC 549).

The court also considered the owner’s response to the notice under Section 133 and the interim relief order under Section 140 of the Act.

The court assessed the evidence cumulatively rather than treating the delayed identification and absence of the vehicle number in the initial FIR as decisive.

PW-2 described seeing the collision, pursuing the car and later giving its registration number; PW-4 corroborated the circumstances, including that PW-2 had provided him the vehicle’s details.

The court considered the delay plausible given the victim’s serious injuries and the family’s immediate focus on his treatment.

The owner’s response to the Section 133 notice, the charge-sheet, the MLC and the mechanical inspection report further supported the claimants’ account.

The court found the insurer’s alternative-accident theory weakened by the absence of rear damage consistent with that account and by the lack of hotel records supporting its witness’s denial of the function.

Applying the probability standard, the court held that the claimants’ version was more probable than the insurer’s.

The matter was remanded to the MACT solely to determine compensation, with directions to decide quantum within three months; the parties were directed to appear before the MACT on 28 October 2026.