Vehicle Owner Liable for Criminal Breach of Trust Under Section 407 IPC Based on Prima Facie Use of Property

The petitioner, seeking relief under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023, challenged an FIR dated July 6, 2019, and the subsequent charge sheet filed on November 3, 2025.

The case originated from a complaint alleging that coal transported from Korba to the Jindal Power Plant was adulterated with ash char and slag.

While the drivers fled the scene, the petitioner was implicated as a vehicle owner and charged under Sections 407, 34, and 212 of the IPC and Section 179 of the Motor Vehicle Act.

The petitioner argued he was not the owner of the vehicles but merely held a special power of attorney to seek interim custody, and had no knowledge of the alleged criminal acts.

1. Whether the FIR and subsequent charge sheet against the petitioner should be quashed on the grounds that the allegations are vague and do not establish a prima facie criminal offence.

2. Whether the ownership or control of a vehicle used in a crime is sufficient to attract liability under Sections 407 and 212 of the IPC without evidence of dishonest intent or knowledge.

The Court considered Section 407 of the IPC (criminal breach of trust by a carrier), which requires proof of entrustment of property and dishonest misappropriation.

Section 212 of the IPC (harbouring an offender), which requires the intention to screen an offender from legal punishment.

The petitioner relied on the precedent of ARCI v. Nimra Cerglass Technics (P) Ltd. (2016) 1 SCC 348, which distinguishes between a mere breach of contract and a criminal offence, establishing that criminal liability requires dishonest intent at the time of the transaction.

The proceedings were governed by the procedural powers under Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 (formerly Section 482 CrPC).

The Court evaluated the petitioner's claim that he was wrongly implicated as he was not the registered owner and lacked mens rea.

The Court observed that the vehicles associated with the petitioner were directly involved in the transportation of substandard/adulterated coal, which constitutes a violation of the transportation contract and a potential criminal breach of trust.

The Court reasoned that as an individual exercising control over the vehicles (via power of attorney), the petitioner cannot be summarily absolved of liability at the preliminary stage.

The Court found that the charge sheet presented a prima facie case necessitating a trial, and the factual disputes raised—such as the lack of knowledge or ownership—are matters of evidence to be determined during the trial process rather than in a quashing petition.

The Court answered that the allegations, involving the use of vehicles for illegal transportation of adulterated goods, warrant a thorough judicial examination.

The petitioner’s prayer to quash the FIR, Final Report, and the order taking cognizance was denied, granting him the liberty to contest the charges during the trial.