Victim’s Appeal for Enhancement of Sentence Inadmissible under BNSS; Right Limited to Inadequate Compensation.

The Appellant (Victim), Tarun Singh, filed three appeals challenging the judgment dated March 19, 2026, and the sentencing order dated March 20, 2026, passed by the Principal and District Judge, North West District, Rohini

The Respondents (Vijay, Rohit, and Rohan Arora) were convicted under Section 307 read with Section 34 of the IPC for the attempted murder of the Appellant

The Trial Court sentenced the convicts to three years of rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 50,000 each

The Appellant sought enhancement of the sentence and the grant of victim compensation, which the Trial Court had not awarded despite noting a prior failed compromise/MoU between the parties involving an amount of Rs. 22,00,000

1. Whether an appeal preferred by a victim for enhancement of a sentence is maintainable under Section 413 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS), 2023 (corresponding to Section 372 of the CrPC)

2. Whether the High Court Division Bench is the appropriate forum to hear a victim's appeal specifically regarding the non-grant of compensation when the main conviction is challenged before a Single Judge

Section 413 of the BNSS (identical to Section 372 of the CrPC), which provides a limited right of appeal to a victim only against (i) acquittal, (ii) conviction for a lesser offence, or (iii) imposition of inadequate compensation

The precedent set in Muskan v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr. (CRL.A. 598/2015), which clarified that while the State may seek enhancement of sentence under Section 377 CrPC (now BNSS), the victim has no statutory right to appeal for the same

Parvinder Kansal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 19 SCC 496, affirming that the right of appeal is a creature of statute and must be strictly restricted to the three eventualities listed in the proviso

The Court observed that the Appellant’s primary prayer for enhancement of the sentence was legally impermissible under Section 413 of the BNSS, as the statutory framework exclusively vests the power to challenge the adequacy of a sentence in the State

The Court reasoned that since the convicts had already challenged the conviction before a Single Judge, the issue of compensation—which is maintainable for a victim under Section 413—should also be adjudicated by a Single Judge rather than the Division Bench

The appeals were dismissed as withdrawn, with liberty granted to the Appellant to approach a Single Judge to challenge the order on sentence solely regarding the grant of compensation under Section 413 of the BNSS