Victims can challenge acquittals in police cases without seeking High Court leave, Delhi High Court rules

An FIR was registered against the petitioner under Section 509 IPC at Police Station Neb Sarai, Delhi, on 11 March 2016.

Following investigation, a chargesheet was filed on 5 August 2018, cognizance was taken on 19 November 2018, and charge was framed on 1 April 2019.

The Magistrate acquitted the petitioner by judgment dated 16 October 2024.

The complainant-victim thereafter filed Criminal Appeal No. 464/2024 before the Sessions Court under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC/Section 413 BNSS, challenging the acquittal.

The petitioner objected that, since the case arose from a police report involving a cognizable and bailable offence, any appeal against acquittal could lie only before the High Court and only after obtaining leave under Section 378 CrPC.

The Sessions Judge rejected the preliminary objection by order dated 6 April 2026.

The petitioner consequently challenged that order and also questioned the constitutional validity and scope of the proviso to Section 372 CrPC/Section 413 BNSS.

Whether the proviso to Section 372 CrPC and the corresponding proviso to Section 413 BNSS are unconstitutional for allegedly discriminating between the State’s right to appeal against acquittal and the victim’s right to appeal without obtaining leave?

Whether the victim’s statutory right of appeal under the proviso is confined to privately instituted complaint cases and excludes cases instituted on the basis of an FIR or police report?

Whether an appeal filed by a victim against an order of acquittal passed by a Magistrate in a police case is maintainable before the Sessions Court without obtaining leave under Section 378 CrPC?

The Court applied the proviso to Section 372 CrPC and the corresponding proviso to Section 413 BNSS, which confer an independent right on a “victim” to appeal against an acquittal, conviction for a lesser offence, or imposition of inadequate compensation; the definition of “victim” under Section 2(wa) CrPC was also relevant.

Section 378 CrPC governs appeals against acquittal by the State and by a complainant, including the requirement of leave or special leave in the situations specified under sub-sections (3) and (4), but those statutory restrictions cannot be read into the victim’s independent right under Section 372.

In Mallikarjun Kodagali (Dead) through LRs v. State of Karnataka, the Supreme Court held that the victim may appeal to the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction and that the proviso to Section 372 must receive a realistic, liberal, progressive, and victim-beneficial interpretation.

In Celestium Financial v. A. Gnanasekaran, the Supreme Court held that a victim’s right of appeal cannot be equated with that of the State or a non-victim complainant and is not subject to the requirement of obtaining special leave under Section 378(4).

Khem Singh v. State of Uttarakhand similarly recognised the proviso as creating an independent and unconditional right of appeal for victims, irrespective of whether the victim is also the complainant.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s contention that the absence of a leave requirement for a victim created unconstitutional discrimination vis-à-vis the State.

Relying principally on Celestium Financial, it held that the victim’s appellate right is legally distinct from the State’s or a complainant’s right and is intended to operate independently and unconditionally.

The Court further held that the proviso to Section 372 contains no restriction confining its operation to private complaint cases; reading such a limitation into the provision would add words that the legislature had not enacted.

The petitioner’s reliance on paragraph 78 of Mallikarjun Kodagali was misplaced because that passage merely distinguished Section 378(4), which is confined to complaint cases, from the broader language of the proviso to Section 372.

The contrary observation relied upon by the petitioner in paragraph 96 of that judgment represented the minority view, whereas the majority affirmed the victim’s right to approach the court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against conviction.

Accordingly, the victim’s appeal arising from the FIR-based prosecution was maintainable before the Sessions Court without prior leave.

The right is not restricted to privately instituted complaint cases and is available in proceedings arising from a police report or FIR.

The Sessions Judge therefore committed no illegality in rejecting the petitioner’s preliminary objection to the maintainability of the victim’s appeal.

The writ petition and pending applications were dismissed, with no order as to costs.