Warning and knowledge of probable fatality from rash driving attracts Section 304 Part II IPC.

On the afternoon of the incident, the accused, a driver of a stage carriage bus, operated the vehicle in an extremely rash and negligent manner at high speed

Despite repeated warnings and pleas from passengers (PW5, PW6) to reduce speed to avoid danger—specifically after passing an accident site—the accused refused, citing the need to maintain the "limited stop" schedule

A mechanical sound was heard beneath the bus, yet the accused continued for 10-20 meters without braking

The bus hit a car, capsized, and caught fire, resulting in 44 deaths and numerous injuries

The trial court acquitted the accused of culpable homicide under Section 304(ii) IPC but convicted him under Sections 279, 337, 338, and 304A IPC

The State appealed the acquittal under Sec. 304(ii), while the accused filed a revision petition against the conviction

The court applied Section 299 and Section 304 Part II of the IPC regarding culpable homicide, and Section 304A regarding death by negligence

It distinguished "intention" from "knowledge," noting that "knowledge" involves being aware that harmful consequences *could* follow

The court relied on *Anbazhagan v. State* [(2024) 20 SCC 500] to differentiate these mental states

It further applied the "three-stage approach" from *State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya* [(1976) 4 SCC 382] to determine if an act constitutes murder, culpable homicide, or negligence

Finally, it referenced *State v. Sanjeev Nanda* [(2012) 8 SCC 450] to establish that driving with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death falls under Section 304 Part II

The court found that while rash driving typically attracts Section 304A, the specific facts here elevated the offense to Section 304(ii).

Crucially, the accused was explicitly warned by passengers (PW5, PW6) of the life-threatening danger, yet he deliberately chose to maintain high speed to meet a schedule

This disregard for human life after being alerted to the risk constitutes "knowledge" that his actions were likely to cause death

The court rejected the defense of mechanical failure, relying on expert testimony (PW70) and even the defense witness (DW1), which stated that the mechanical defect was a "by-product" of over-speeding and that braking/steering systems remain functional even if a propeller shaft breaks

The court concluded that the trial court erred in treating the 44 deaths as a result of mere negligence when the "direct motivating force" was the accused's deliberate choice to risk lives

The Court held the accused guilty of Culpable Homicide Not Amounting to Murder under Section 304(ii) IPC, alongside Sections 279, 337, and 338 IPC

The accused was sentenced to five years of simple imprisonment and a fine of ₹2 Lakh, with a default sentence of one year

The sentences for the minor offenses were confirmed to run concurrently, and the bail bonds were canceled