Whether an accused knew a document was forged is a matter for trial.

The complainant alleged that Sushil Kumar had produced a false medical certificate in a pending civil suit to obtain the reopening of his evidence.

Following further investigation, a charge-sheet was filed under Sections 465 and 471 IPC; the Magistrate later took cognizance of those offences, and the revisional court affirmed that order.

After photocopies of documents referred to in the charge-sheet were produced when the originals could not be located, Kumar sought discharge under Section 258 Cr.P.C.

The Magistrate dismissed the application, finding a prima facie case, and the revisional court affirmed.

Kumar challenged both the cognizance orders and the later orders refusing to stop the proceedings before the High Court under Section 528 BNSS.

Whether the material on record disclosed a prima facie case against Kumar for offences under Sections 465 and 471 IPC, sufficient to sustain cognizance and continuation of the proceedings.

Whether the order dismissing Kumar’s application under Section 258 Cr.P.C., and the revisional order affirming it, warranted interference under Section 528 BNSS.

Section 258 Cr.P.C. permits a Magistrate, in a qualifying summons-case instituted otherwise than upon complaint, to stop proceedings for recorded reasons; it does not confer an accused with an automatic right to terminate proceedings where the material discloses a prima facie case requiring adjudication.

Sections 465 and 471 IPC concern, respectively, punishment for forgery and the fraudulent or dishonest use as genuine of a forged document, with the latter requiring knowledge or reason to believe that the document is forged.

At the cognizance and threshold-discharge stage, disputed questions of knowledge, intention and evidentiary weight may require determination at trial rather than final resolution on the accused’s explanation alone.

The Court considered its inherent jurisdiction under Section 528 BNSS in reviewing the challenged orders.

The investigation yielded specific material casting doubt on the certificate’s authenticity: the address did not correspond to the stated hospital or doctor, and the hospital reportedly had no such doctor, certificate or admission record.

The Court also relied on Kumar’s own account that he obtained the certificate through an intermediary after being told the treating doctor was unwilling to provide one, paid ₹2,000, and later used it in the civil case.

Whether those circumstances established knowledge or reason to believe the document was forged was, in the Court’s view, a matter for evidence.

That another person may have prepared the certificate did not, by itself, answer whether Kumar knowingly used it as genuine.

Nor did the civil court’s procedural decision to reopen evidence determine the certificate’s genuineness or Kumar’s criminal liability.

The revisional court had examined the merits irrespective of whether Section 258 applied, and the High Court found no basis to interfere.

It found no ground to interfere with the cognizance order or the orders dismissing the Section 258 application and the related revisions.

Both petitions were dismissed; pending applications, if any, were disposed of.